



INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1982-1984

A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF STATISTICS AND TRENDS




INDICATOR PROJECT SOUTH AFRICA
Centre for Applied Social Sciences • University of Natal • Durban



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A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF STATISTICS AND TRENDS



EDITOR: Graham Howe

August 1984

INDICATOR PROJECT SOUTH AFRICA 
Centre for Applied Social Sciences • University of Natal • Durban

'Industrial Relations in South Africa 1982/84:
A Comparative Review of Statistics and Trends'
is published by the Centre for Applied Social
Sciences, University of Natal, Durban, August
1984.

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Survey of IR Commentators' Interpretations
conducted by Indicator SA Researchers Graham Howe
and Loretta van Schalkwyk

Cover Design and Tables: Maria Criticos

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PREFACE

This comparative review of IR statistics and trends represents a new publishing venture for the Indicator SA project. The three articles which have been compiled here differ substantially in form, comprising a data base on strike activity between 1982/84, a guest perspective presenting a particular set of IR trend interpretations, and lastly, a data trendline section based on an Indicator SA survey of 25 leading IR commentators' opinions on labour trends during 1983.

The publication has been produced as a documentary report and a reference source. Depending on feedback and whether subscribers are of the opinion that the report fulfils a useful function, it is possible that this type of comparative IR review might subsequently be produced on an annual basis by the Indicator SA Project.

The editor would like to thank Sonia Bendix of Industrial Relations Trend Consultants (IRTC) of Cape Town for submitting an original IR review for publication. Ms Bendix in turn wishes to make known her 'grateful acknowledgement to Professor Willy Bendix, Director of Stellenbosch University's IR Research Unit, for his advice and opinion' in the development of her review. The present version has been abridged and updated, to include some major developments that have occurred on the labour scene during the first half of 1984.

The third and final article in the following IR report is derived from a comparative survey of IR trend interpretations conducted by Indicator SA researchers Graham Howe and Loretta van Schalkwyk. This exercise provides an analysis of the responses of a representative cross-section of IR experts to major South African IR issues and trends in 1983.

PART ONE

STRIKE TREND INDICATORS 1982/84 **A Comparative Review of Official and Independent Monitors**

By Indicator SA Researcher Graham Howe

1 Introduction: Information Update

Five years have now passed since the Wiehahn Commission completed its seminal investigation into existing labour legislation to provide for improved industrial relations in South Africa. Between 1979/81 the incorporation of these recommendations into industrial legislation ushered in a new era of collective bargaining in structure, forms and attitudes, marking a watershed turning point now commonly referred to as the 'post-Wiehahn' period.

Some fundamental industrial 'rights' were created through the legislative revision of key aspects of the old Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 1924. The amended and renamed Labour Relations Act of 1981 had already extended the pivotal definition of 'employee' to cover urban black workers and subsequently extended the same industrial protection to migrant workers. Similarly, as a sequel to the major amendments of 1979, most references to race in the ICA were simultaneously eliminated and the option of uni-racial or multi-racial identity left entirely in the hands of the individual trade union.

Appropriately enough, the publication of the major report released by the standing National Manpower Commission (NMC) in May this year marked the fifth anniversary of the publication of the Wiehahn Commission Report.¹ The first NMC Report provides some interesting insights into the perceptions of the ruling party and its labour advisors about the relative merits and shortcomings of labour legislation as amended since 1979. The Report also provides the perceptive reader with a look into the likely future direction of government intervention in industrial relations.

The NMC and the Registration Issue

In response to the ongoing registration controversy and the distance kept by many new unions from the statutory collective bargaining system and in order to bring these bodies within the official industrial ambit, the NMC proposed that

o the formal registration process be replaced by introducing a new simplified administrative system of minimum legal requirements for all trade unions
(company registration is a useful analogy of a 'neutral' administrative process here)

o race should no longer feature or be stipulated on registration

o the existing union right of objection to the registration of a new union be waived and proof of representativeness should not be a criterion.²

Even greater government intervention and control in the collective bargaining process is envisaged in the NMC's recommendations that:

o no trade union be allowed to operate unless it complies with these (mandatory) minimal registration requirements

o registration be denied if the registrar believes that a trade union's main objective does not serve or specify its members' interests in terms of industry, trade occupation and area, or if the union receives funds from foreign sources

o the current provision that the government registrar must have access to a union's constitution, membership lists and financial statements should remain in force.

These NMC recommendations clearly contradict the government's previously declared support for the principle of allowing maximal employer/employee self-governance in industrial relations. Union participation within the official collective bargaining system is envisaged as being compulsory, and unions refusing to register would face prosecution. Even the much criticised Labour Relations Amendment Bill introduced in parliament this year³, which requires unregistered unions to submit copies of plant-level agreements and other information to the Department of Manpower, does not go as far as these new proposals in attempting to control the structures and processes of collective bargaining. In the latter case, the penalty for non-compliance will be that plant-level agreements negotiated between unregistered unions and employers will be unenforceable in the courts.

The other main thrust of the NMC's recommendations, dealing with the Industrial Court and the 'unfair labour practice' concept, both controversial features of the post-Wiehahn period of industrial reform, is analysed in the forthcoming Indicator SA Industrial Monitor.

Industrial and Political Reform

Collective bargaining does not occur in isolation from the surrounding political and social structures and it is inevitable that legislative reform within the economic sphere is both affected and constrained by developments in the wider society. In South Africa today, an obvious contradiction is playing itself out between the industrial incorporation of black workers and the political exclusion of their community from the central polity. African migrant workers can never be full participants in the industrial relations arena, obtain real job security or effectively withhold their labour while the threat of deportation to a distant homeland and unemployment hangs over them.

In recent interviews, Professor Wiehahn gives his qualified praise of the government's implementation of his commission's proposals, but indicates that the limits of industrial reform are dictated by apartheid ideology and legislation: 'Although tremendous strides have been made influx control'.⁴ He advocates a legislative process whereby influx control might be applied on a non-racial basis in order to depoliticise the issue, and expresses the belief that labour reforms will be undermined unless reforms do not follow in other areas.⁵

Another detrimental consequence for industrial relations where 'political' factors impinge is the distrust arising from perceived collusion between management and government in the application of security legislation. The ability of trade unions to organise and recruit within plants and the larger community is often severely constrained by laws banning meetings, the Intimidation Act, security police detentions, and repressive labour legislation passed by homeland governments. During 1983, 74 of the 453 people who were detained in South Africa were trade union general secretaries, officials and members, the total figure showing a 72 percent increase over the 264 detentions which occurred in 1982.⁶

Overt 'political' factors also intrude at the level of trade union organisation, as demonstrated by the current divisions in the new labour movement over the relationship to opposition political forces such as the United Democratic Front, Black Consciousness organisations such as the National Forum Committee, Inkatha and civic groupings. In the absence of institutional political vehicles of real power, there is always bound to be an overlap between the labour and extra-parliamentary political movements in South Africa.

Union Unity and Regional Representation

During the first six months of 1984 the emergent labour movement's espoused goal of creating one 'super union federation' to represent all workers seemed finally to be in sight. In early March, 25 unions

representing approximately 300 000 workers broke a year-long impasse when they agreed to establish a federation of 'industrially-based' unions at a meeting in Johannesburg. Three other 'community-linked', general worker unions, SAAWU, GAWU and MGWU (see appendix 1: union acronyms) subsequently did not attend a unity meeting held in Durban in early April, amidst controversy as to whether they were expelled or had withdrawn after refusing proffered observer status.

The seven remaining groupings involved, with numbers of member unions in brackets, are FOSATU (9), CUSA (11), CCAWUSA, AFCWU and FCWU, GWU and the CTMEA.⁷ A final draft of the new trade union federation plan formulated by a feasibility committee is currently being circulated to unions which are party to the unity talks.

A new alliance of unregistered, independent trade unions was also formed in late May this year, claiming a combined membership of 75 000 workers nationwide. The alliance is comprised of ABWU, AWU, BAMCWU, BEEWU, BGWU, IAWUSA and NUWSA. The alliance was motivated by a black consciousness ideological stance held in common among other factors. Its aims are to promote, develop and maintain an authentic black working-class leadership.⁸

An interesting regional development is the possibility of a new federation of mineworkers' unions will be formed to represent workers from South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe in negotiations with mutual employers and at the Miners' International Federation. Talks between NUM (with the support of BAMCWU) and other mineworker unions in Southern Africa are scheduled to take place soon.⁹ At Maseru in May this year, a South African union delegation attended a conference of Southern African labour movements, another precedent on the labour scene.

Union Disunity and Political Affiliation

On the other hand, a major feature of labour developments in 1984 so far has been the conflict and disunity over both political and structural identity among the new trade unions, as evident in the divide between the pragmatic, industrial unions and the community-based, general worker unions at the unity talks. In mid-July this year, dissidents within MAWU, one of FOSATU's flagship unions, broke away and formed a new union, the United Mining, Metal and Allied Workers' Union (UMMAWOSA). In a subsequent press statement, UMMAWOSA's president Andrew Zulu stated that, 'We rejected white intellectual bureaucracy We don't want to be told not to join the UDF, Inkatha or AZAPO You can't limit politics in this country to the factory floor'.¹⁰ FOSATU president Chris Dlamini's response to such criticism of the federation's opposition to joining community political organisations was that, 'We are trying to build an independent worker movement we cannot affiliate to any political organisation'.¹¹

During 1984, other prominent trade unions have been beset by conflict, undoubtedly related to the ongoing recession and the greater demands made by rank-and-file members on union leadership. These divisions stem from a combination of factors such as industrial demarcation, union form and structure, community relationships and political affiliations, and white intellectual involvement, all of which often tend to overlap. The resultant expulsions, splits and break-aways include:

- o Three key SAAWU executive members, including charismatic general secretary Sam Kikine, were expelled at a conference in April by a faction led by president Thozamile Gqweta. One of those expelled, Herbert Barnabas, accused individuals in the UDF of causing the dissension, stating that, 'Each of the SAAWU branches must be left to make up their own minds about the UDF, and the UDF should not dictate that SAAWU automatically affiliate to UDF'.¹² Supreme Court action in mid-June resulted in the ousted officials being reinstated.
- o The black consciousness-orientated MWASA split into two factions, the one Cape based and the other Transvaal/Natal based, at its annual congress in late January. The two issues at the root of the conflict were the proposed opening of union membership to whites and affiliation to UDF and the National Forum Committee (NFC).
- o Six executive members, including national organiser Government Zini, were expelled from the Port Elizabeth-based MACWUSA in May amidst speculation that the split was leading to the creation of a new motor union.¹³
- o Seven unions have disaffiliated from TUCSA ranks since its controversial annual congress last year.¹⁴

2 Sources and Methodology

Since 1973, when the Durban strikes heralded a resurgence of strike activity by black workers, the sphere of labour research and industrial relations consultancy has become in itself a growth industry, comparable to the monitoring of race relations in South Africa.

The recording of strike statistics as a leading indicator of industrial conflict is problematic, however. Although figures released by independent monitoring services concur to a certain degree, they diverge substantially from those figures which emerge from official sources. For example, in many cases independent statistics amount to only half the number of strikes recorded in official figures released by the Department of Manpower.

Significant discrepancies arise from a number of methodological variables:

- o Forms of monitoring differ, as primary government and trade union sources, and secondary press sources are used in different combinations by the various monitoring services
- o The unknown factor of unreported strikes or work stoppages
- o Workable common definitions of what constitutes a 'strike' or a 'work stoppage' have yet to be developed as a basis for comparative evaluations
- o Official and independent monitors may or may not include strikes in both the independent and/or non-independent homelands in their strike count for the central economy
- o Simultaneous actions initiated against one employer or group of employers, over the same issue, at different branches or centres, may be differentially interpreted as constituting one or several strikes
- o Whether provisional or 'doctored' final official figures become the point of reference for comparisons drawn at a later stage between annual strike totals.

The controversy surrounding the monitoring of industrial conflict only begins with these methodological and statistical problems, however. Different sets of facts and figures give rise to diverse interpretations of trends, compounded by the subjective nature of an exercise in which the viewpoints and allegiances of the various commentators come into play, be they government, management or trade union oriented.

The primary aim of the review is to derive general strike trends from a comparative data base incorporating a range of leading sources and assess contemporary developments in the industrial relations arena. Because the estimates presented by the different monitoring services differ substantially in some cases, no one source should be regarded as the last word in strike statistics or trends.

The following analysis of strike activity between 1982/84 is based on data and trend interpretations collated from:

- o Indicator SA's press clipping files
- o Department of Manpower (DOM) and National Manpower Commission data and reports
- o FOSATU/CUSA records

and annual reviews of industrial relations in South Africa published by:

- o the Anglo American Corporation's (AAC) Industrial Relations Department
- o the Institute for Industrial Relations (IIR)
- o Andrew Levy's Industrial Relations Data (IRD)
- o Willy Bendix's Industrial Relations Trend Consultants (IRTC).

3 Overview: Strike Patterns

The final pattern of strike activity to emerge from 1983 is one of slightly less strikes, of marginally shorter duration, involving fewer workers and less manpower loss, which were very often initiated or supported by the less established members of the emergent black union movement. One of the most interesting features of labour unrest last year is that many apparently spontaneous, non-union worker strikes occurred. Although their statistics differ in degree, the various monitoring services reach consensus on their interpretation of a general trend of an especially significant reduction in both total manhour/manday loss and in the numbers of participants in strike activity. These developments may be attributed to the initial effects of recessionary conditions in 1983, specifically the latent threat of retrenchment and unemployment.

Post June 1983 Upswing

In the second half of 1983, the actual strike count increased steadily, although in terms of the more critical variable of manhour loss, strike activity in general was no 'greater' than in the preceding six months. The upswing in strike frequency since mid-1983 has continued into 1984 and stoppages are now proving to be of increasing average length.

According to recently released DOM figures for the the first five months of 1984, 160 strikes occurred between January to May, involving 35 754 workers.¹⁵ In fact, the strike count in the first quarter of this year alone jumped by 40 percent, according to Andrew Levy's latest Industrial Relations Data estimate.¹⁶ The current resurgence of strike activity probably demonstrates the 'lag' effects of an unbroken recession and price rises in basic worker necessities, as most of these strikes have been triggered by wage and related dismissal/retrenchment issues.

1982/83 DOM Estimates

According to Manpower Director-General Piet van der Merwe, this represents a massive increase over the 54 strikes involving 7 098 workers recorded by his department over the same period in 1983.¹⁷ His comparison of official records for January-May 1984 to the same period in 1983 shows that this year, there were almost three times as many strikes and five times as many workers involved.

However, it would appear that though there has undoubtedly been a quantum jump in strike activity, the margin of increase is nowhere near as wide as the Department believes and the press has reported. As Table 1 demonstrates, the 'final' official strike count for the first five months of 1983 recorded 82 strikes.¹⁸

In other words, the official strike count should really show that an increase of twice (and not three times) as many strikes occurred during January-May 1984 in comparison to the same period in 1983. This inaccuracy presumably stems from the fact that the official comparison is derived from last year's provisional DOM figure. This statistical anomaly reveals further shortcomings in strike record methodology and illustrates the fallibility of both official and press monitored strike counts.

Earlier Downswing Trend

A downswing in strike activity started to establish itself in the latter half of 1982. Only 27 strikes out of a total of 171 recorded by the IIR during 1982 occurred from September to December, whereas 144 strikes took place in the preceding eight months.¹⁹ In fact, the period August 1982 to May 1983 reflects a much more consistent pattern of diminished labour unrest than 1983 as a whole. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the relative decline in labour action which continued into the first five months of 1983.

4 Monitor Discrepancies on Strike Variables

1983/84 DOM Comparisons

According to figures released by the Minister of Manpower, Mr P T C du Plessis, a total of 60 332 workers took part in 336 strikes in 1983 (an average of 180 workers per strike), resulting in a loss of 969 504 manhours. An additional 27 256 manhours were lost through work stoppages by 4 137 workers.²⁰

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Table 1

● **MONTHLY STRIKE COUNT, 1983** ●

Comparison of four monitors¹

NUMBER OF STRIKES RECORDED				
	AAC	IIR	IRTC	DOM
January		4	4	10
February		6	7	19
March	<i>1st Quarter</i> 25	6	7	21
April		2	9	14
May		4	6	18
June	<i>2nd Quarter</i> 38	26	24	31
July		24	21	48
August		12	26	33
September	<i>3rd Quarter</i> 24	17	18	23
October		34	31	59
November		38	24	34
December	<i>4th Quarter</i> 37	26	13	(26) ²
TOTAL	124	196	190	336

AAC *Anglo American Corporation*
IIR *Institute for Industrial Relations*
IRTC *Industrial Relations Trends Consultants*
DOM *Department of Manpower*

FOOTNOTE


¹ The discrepancy between these different sources of statistics stem from methodological variables. These include differing definitions and confusion between work stoppages as opposed to strikes; forms of monitoring, ie. from press, union or state sources etc. See section on Sources and Methodology.
² See discussion on problematic December strike count, section on Monitor Discrepancies

SOURCES FOR TABLES 1 & 2

Anglo American Corporation (AAC) *Quarterly Reviews of Industrial Relations* Johannesburg: AAC Industrial Relations Department, 1983
 Bendix (IRTC) *Industrial Relations Review 1983 and Prognosis 1984* University of Stellenbosch, SA
 Industrial Relations Journal Vol 4 No 1
 IIR *Review of Industrial Relations in South Africa 1983* Johannesburg: IIR
 Indicator Project SA Press Clippings

Table 2

• MONTHLY STRIKE COUNT GRAPH, 1983 •
Comparison of four monitors



In comparison, DOM figures for 1982 put worker involvement at 141 571 in 394 strikes (an average of 359 workers per strike) and manhour loss at 2 922 696 or 365 337 mandays.²¹ Thus according to DOM, 81 239 less workers were involved in strikes in 1983 than in 1982, exactly half the average number of workers were involved per strike in 1983 vis-a-vis 1982 and the number of manhours lost during 1983 was approximately one third of total manhours lost in 1982.

Striking Discrepancies

However, the accuracy of DOM figures for 1983 is questionable, as the strike count had reached 220 by November according to their records, yet the final DOM tally for last year soared to 336 strikes. By extrapolation from their provisional estimate, this implies that more than 100 strikes occurred during December! This concentration of strike activity during December, traditionally a period of decreased industrial activity and widespread plant shutdowns after the 15th is hardly plausible.

An explanation of this statistical anomaly might be that some juggling took place between DOM's provisional figures released in November and its final strike count for 1983, published early this year. In fact, DOM subsequently released a monthly strike breakdown based on the 336 figure, showing only 26 strikes for December, which substantiates this impression of a dramatic revision of records.²² According to Levy, the latter figures 'must throw the severest doubt on the figures for the first 11 months'.²³

Yet, the discrepancy between these two sets of figures led the South African Institute for Race Relations, in its Annual Survey for 1983, to infer that, 'A sharp increase in strikes occurred during December, when 104 were held, almost one third of the figure for the whole of the preceding 11 months'.²⁴ The fact that one labour expert questions the integrity of these figures, while another leading monitor accepts them at face value, illustrates the danger of relying on strike figures published by any single source, be it primary (official or trade union monitors) or secondary (press or independent monitors).

Against DOM's final count of 336 strikes for 1983, the IIR recorded 196 strikes in 1983 (58.3% of the DOM figure) and Bendix's IRTC gave an even lower total of 190 strikes (56.5% of the DOM figure) (see tables 1 and 2). Comparison between the 1983 figures released by IRTC and those released by DOM reveal further discrepancies, as shown in table 3.

Another less extreme example is the DOM figure of 2.25 mandays for the average duration of strikes in 1983, compared to 2.58 average mandays lost per strike during 1982.²⁵ On the other hand, according to IRTC

Table 3	● STRIKE VARIABLES 1983 ● <i>Comparison of two Monitors</i>		
	DOM	IRTC	Discrepancy
Total No of Workers involved in Strikes	60 332	43 421	16 911
No of Strikes	336	190	146
Manhour loss	969 504	1 012 381	-42 877
Average No of Workers per Strike	180	229	-49
SOURCES S Bendix op cit: 35 Hansard 21 February 1984, Questions: Col 274			

Table 4	● STRIKE TRIGGERS, 1982/1983 ● <i>Comparison of two monitors</i>				
	No. of strikes 1983		% of total 1983		Comparative % 1982
	IRTC	IIR	IRTC	IIR	IRTC IIR
Wages/remuneration	61	77	32,1	29,4	48 45
Dismissal	47	65	24,8	24,8	20 16,4
Diverse, general grievances	21	70	11,1	26,7	16 11,1
Specific grievance regarding supervisor/manager	20		10,5		
Retrenchment	13	13	6,8	5	7,8 4,8
Recognition	11	20	5,8	7,7	5,3 10
Pensions	5	3	2,6	1,1	3,1 3,2
Overtime	4	7	2,1	2,7	
Referendum (direct & indirect)	4		2,1		
Safety	3		1,6		
Sympathy with strikers at another company	1	1	0,5	0,4	
Unknown		6		2,3	
Working conditions/benefits					9,5
SOURCES: 1 Bendix (IRTC) Review of Industrial Relations op cit. 2 IIR Reviews of Industrial Relations in South Africa 1982 and 1983 op cit					

data, the average duration of strikes for the whole of 1983 was 2.4 mandays. This estimate is not markedly lower than the annual IRTC figure for 1982 when strikes lasted 2.5 mandays on average.²⁶

Such marked differences between official and independent monitors of strike facts and figures over the same period makes it very difficult to draw hard and fast conclusions as to specific rather than general trends in strike activity. More important, however, are the wider questions as to methodological variables and bias in strike monitoring raised by such discrepancies.

5 Recessionary Strike Triggers

Increased strike activity since mid-1983 up until the first quarter of 1984, primarily triggered by wage discontent, would appear to be related to a combination of the following 'lag' factors in the context of continuing recession:

- o the dearth of substantial annual wage increases
- o the increasingly beleaguered economic position of black workers
- o greater numbers of unionised workers and a more organised workforce in general.

According to IRD estimates of the distribution of strike triggers between 1979/83, the three major categories have been wages (34.42%), 'discipline' dismissals (24.31%) and grievances (24.04%).²⁷

In 1983 itself, although wage discontent is again the leading strike trigger and is obviously a common denominator of worker discontent, it is not necessarily the specific trigger issue for particular strikes. From table 4, it is evident that dissatisfaction with wages last year was often accompanied by other grievances or the demand for recognition, particularly where the less established unions were involved.

The Minister of Manpower stated that 101 out of 297 strikes by black workers in 1983, or 34 percent, arose out of wage demands.²⁸ Yet according to IIR statistics for last year, 28.6 percent of their strike total resulted from wage issues, a substantial drop from their 45 percent wage-related strike estimate for 1982 (see table 4).

Periodisation Problems

The incidence of particular strike issues throughout 1982 or 1983 is not coherent enough over either of these specific twelve-month periods to enable the analyst to extract definitive annual trends. For example, although IRD data shows that wage discontent was the cause of 46.91 percent of all strikes in the first half of 1982, wages as an immediate strike trigger dropped as low as 6.6 percent over the fourth quarter of that year and the first quarter of 1983, respectively.²⁹ Yet from mid-1983 to the present, there has been a major resurgence of wage-related strike activity. In 1983, 50 of the 61 wage-related strikes (or 81.9%) monitored by IRTC occurred after June 1983.³⁰

In the case of other major strike triggers, a similarly longer time period view is again useful in setting a less arbitrary backdrop for the increase, resurgence or decrease of particular labour trends in 1983. Following a tendency already established in the latter half of 1982, dismissals and retrenchment became another leading strike trigger during 1983, particularly in relation to alleged victimisation of certain workers (in the case of individual dismissals), summary dismissals of striking workers, and selective re-employment practices.

Dismissals and Grievances

According to IIR estimates, 65 strikes occurred over dismissals last year, accounting for 24.8 percent of all strike actions and 13 strikes took place over retrenchment, accounting for 5 percent of all strike actions (see table 4).

The IRTC estimate of 41 strikes sparked off by general and specific grievances in 1983, represents an overall increase of 25 percent compared to this issue as a strike trigger in the previous year. Specific complaints regarding managers, especially derogatory racist attitudes held by supervisors, triggered off 20 strikes alone or 10.5 percent of all strike actions (see table 4).

Secondary Strike Issues

A diverse range of other worker issues and subsequent strike triggers emerged during 1982/3, mainly concerning:

- o recognition of union status and presence
- o industrial health and unsafe working conditions, especially in the mining and textile industries
- o the special position of female employees as regards maternity leave/benefits, sexual harassment and dignity in the workplace

- o the need to cut overtime in the context of retrenchment, in order to raise employment levels
- o pension and taxation legislation and practices.
- o the support of some employers for 'yes' referendum petitions.

Pension and Tax Strikes

While random pension strikes have intermittently occurred since the attempted introduction of new legislation in 1981, the emphasis of last year's several strikes triggered by this controversial issue seemed to shift to objections against the present appropriation of funds and to demands for employee representation on pension boards.

The new unitary system of taxation implemented in March 1984 was rejected in statements made by the emergent labour movement, related to the thorny issue of taxation without consultation or representation among other aspects.³¹ SAAWU in particular threatened strike action in protest, raising management fears of a wave of tax strikes, with the pensions strike precedent in mind. However, only a few strikes subsequently took place where the amended Income Tax Act was cited as a primary or accompanying issue.³²

This year's initial 1 percent GST hike evoked a similarly critical reaction from a range of unions, though the second GST increase of 3 percent which took effect from 1 July has been given a more mixed reaction, as the new GST dispensation differentiates between non-taxable basic necessities and other taxable commodities.

6 Trade Union and Worker Strikes

The typology of strike activity applied by Bendix in a lengthy diagnosis of industrial relations trends during 1983, provides a useful framework to analyse the diverse actions and strategies which emerged in 1983.³³ The four interrelated categories used are:

- o demonstration-enforcement strikes by relatively established unions from the ranks of the new black labour movement. This category included the three strike leaders for 1983, CCAWUSA, MAWU and SAAWU respectively (see table 5)
- o strategic-demonstration or strategic-enforcement strikes by the smaller, newer unions, to promote recruitment or consolidate their position in an industry. These included PWAWU, CWIU and BCAWU and other

Table 5

● **COMPARISON OF UNIONS INVOLVED IN STRIKES, 1983¹** ●

	No. of Strikes	% of Total
Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union (unaffiliated)	33	17,4
Metal and Allied Workers Union (FOSATU)	24 (53)	12,6
South African Allied Workers Union (unaffiliated)	24	12,6
Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union (FOSATU)	9 (12)	4,8
Chemical Workers Industrial Union (FOSATU)	8 (17)	4,2
National Union of Textile Workers (FOSATU)	7 (18)	3,7
Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union (FOSATU)	7 (6)	3,7
Building Construction and Allied Workers Union (CUSA)	4	2,1
South African Chemical Workers Union (CUSA)	4	2,1
General Workers Union (unaffiliated)	3	1,6
National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (FOSATU)	3 (12)	1,6
Food and Beverage Workers Union (CUSA)	3	1,6
African Food and Canning Workers Union (unaffiliated)	2	1,1
Transport and General Workers Union (FOSATU)	2 (6)	1,1
Insurance and Assurance Workers Union (unaffiliated)	2	1,1
National General Workers Union (unaffiliated)	2	1,1
Black Health and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (unaffiliated)	2	1,1
African Allied Workers Union (unaffiliated)	2	1,1
National Sugar and Refining and Allied Industries Employees Union (unaffiliated)	2	1,1
Media Workers Association of South Africa (unaffiliated)	1	,5
National Union of Mineworkers (CUSA)	1	,5
Textile Workers Union (CUSA)	1	,5
Black Allied Workers Union (unaffiliated)	1	,5
General Workers Union of South Africa (unaffiliated)	1	,5
General and Allied Workers Union (unaffiliated)	1	,5
National Federation of Workers (unaffiliated)	1	,5
Hotel Liquor and Catering Workers Union	1	,5
Rail, Air and Sea Transport Workers Union	1	,5
No overt or known union involvement	38	20,0
TOTAL	190	100,0

FOOTNOTE

¹ FOSATU figures in brackets

SOURCES:

Bendix (IRTC), Review of Industrial Relations op cit
FOSATU Annual Report 1983

unions, mostly within the ranks of FOSATU and CUSA (See appendix 1: trade union acronym key)

o 'pure' strategic-demonstration strikes by lesser known or hitherto unknown unions, 'intent on establishing presence when and where the opportunity arises. These unions utilised both general discontent and dissatisfaction with already established unions to gain presence.'³⁴ Most unions in this category were independents, such as IAWUSA, BHAWUSA and BAWU

o spontaneous-demonstration strike actions by workers triggered off by specific incidents and either later supported by or involving unions.

The major trend reflected in table 5 is that in 38 cases or 20 percent of the strikes recorded by IRTC during 1983, no overt union involvement was reported. In comparison, the IIR reports that in the case of 22 out of 196 strikes (11.2%) recorded from press sources, no mention was made of union involvement. This significant proportion of spontaneous strike activity is indicative of a heightened level of worker organisation in general.

Furthermore, 23 or 12.1 percent of the 190 actions recorded in table 4, show involvement by unions which did not participate in more than two strikes altogether. Many of these unions were small, independents or newcomers. In other words, according to IRTC figures, almost one third of the strikes which occurred during 1983 were either spontaneous in nature or initiated by unions utilising discontent to establish presence. This trend differs significantly from 1982 when the more established of the newer unions were involved in the vast majority of strike actions.


Union Strike Leaders

To establish the relative strength of the actions undertaken by various unions, a complex comparison and weighting of variables such as the number of strikes, the manhours involved and the success rate would have to be made. As a scale of reference for individual union action in 1983 (see table 6), the five strike leaders for the period 1979/82, all from the more established 'new' unions, were MAWU, NAAWU, SAAWU, NUTW and FCWU; in differing order, depending on measurement in terms of mandays lost or number of incidents.³⁵

This group of unions again came to the fore in 1983, though in differing degree. After intense union organisation in the eastern Cape between 1980/81, security police harassment had undoubtedly hampered SAAWU activity during 1982. Then in 1983, the 100 000 member-strong SAAWU experienced a noticeable resurgence and was involved in 24 strikes, even

Table 6

**DISTRIBUTION OF STRIKES AMONG UNION GROUPINGS
AND WORKERS, 1983**



TOTAL: 190 strikes

Source: Bendix (IRTC) *Review of Industrial Relations* op cit.

though restricted in scope by being banned in the Ciskei in September. NAAWU actions, however, decreased during 1983, although the union organised the first nationwide strike at Autoplastics.

CCAWUSA organised 33 strikes, which accounted for the single largest proportion (17.4%) of strike action last year, surpassing the total of 24 strikes organised by MAWU, the strike leader for 1982.

CCAWUSA embarked on a recruitment campaign among large retail companies and had grown to 30 000 members by mid-1983.

Federations and Independents

According to an IRD special report on industrial action, the distribution of strike action among the various union groupings over the period 1981/82 showed FOSATU involvement in 65.11 percent of all cases, CUSA unions in 7.75 percent and the Independents (mainly SAAWU, GWU, MACWUSA and CCAWUSA) in 27.13 percent, respectively.³⁶ IRTC figures show that though FOSATU unions were involved in approximately 60 percent of all strikes in 1982, their participation in strike activity decreased significantly to 30.5 percent of all cases in 1983 (see table 6). On the other hand, FOSATU unions had concluded 285 recognition agreements by the end of 1983, with MAWU having negotiated 122 of these, according to FOSATU's annual report.³⁷

During 1983, a number of strikes were initiated or supported by previously less active unions, particularly from FOSATU and CUSA ranks. These include FOSATU's PWAU, CWIU and TGWU, and CUSA's BCAWU, SACWU and FBWU, some of which undertook unprecedented strike action at plant level (see table 5). According to CUSA records, CUSA membership between 1982/83 grew from 100 000 to 165 592 and as of October 1983, unions belonging to the confederation had entered 62 recognition agreements.³⁸

The strike record of unaffiliated unions reflected in table 7 is swelled by CCAWUSA and SAAWU, as well as by the comparatively large number of unaffiliated unions engaged in isolated actions.

7 Conclusion: Union Strategy and Legal Strikes

In the sphere of strike activity, the occurrence of several legal strikes between 1983 and the present is one event which substantiates the common trend interpretation of greater union participation within the parameters of the legal niceties of official collective bargaining.

It also reflects the increased expression of a functioning worker/management relationship based on a less unequal power equation.

Where either an Industrial Council or Conciliation Board fails to resolve a dispute after a mandatory 'cooling off' period of 30 days, and a secret ballot indicates majority union support, a 'legal' strike may be called. In July last year, the NUTW declared the first legal strike by black workers in 7 years. The few historic legal strikes which have occurred include:

- o the legal strike precedent at Armourplate in 1976
- o the NUTW strike at Natal Thread in Hammarsdale, Natal; July 1983
- o the first national legal strike organised by SACWU at three AECL plants, in mid-January 1984
- o the NUTW strike at SA Fabrics in late January this year.

Many labour commentators concur on the initial inhibiting effect of continued recession on the 'illegal' strike actions and wage demands of the emergent black labour movement in 1983. The continued growth of a union support infra-structure comprised of legal, economic and strategy advisors also constitutes a major factor influencing increased usage of selective aspects of the statutory collective bargaining system last year, especially in the case of conciliation boards and the Industrial Court.

This does not mean that a dramatic trend emerged in 1983 whereby the option of strike action was simply replaced by unionist preference for the official dispute-settling mechanisms. In fact, the upswing in strike frequency since mid-1983, particularly over wage-related issues, belies such an interpretation and indicates that in the long-term, recessionary conditions have anything but an inhibiting impact.

Instead, the sophisticated contemporary practice of the new labour movement, which has emerged in the post-Wiehahn period, is apparently to incorporate a wide range of tactics in conjunction with 'illegal' strike action. These range from concluding plant-level agreements, cautiously participating in negotiations at Industrial Council level and asserting unfair labour practices through the Industrial Court, to pursuing a broad spectrum of newly identified worker rights and issues.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 National Manpower Commission, Report on an Investigation into the Levels of Collective Bargaining and Works Councils, the Registration of Trade Unions and Employers' Organisations and Related Matters, and the Industrial Court
- 2 Ibid: 361/72
- 3 See Bendix article, 'The Government and Industrial Legislation'
- 4 Interview in Sunday Tribune, 1 July 1984
- 5 Sunday Tribune, 3 June 1984
- 6 IIR Annual Industrial Relations Review: 10
- 7 The Sowetan, 6 March 1984 and Financial Mail, 30 March 1984: 48
- 8 The Sowetan, 15 June 1984
- 9 Star, 14 June 1984
- 10 A Zulu in City Press, 29 July 1984
- 11 C Dlamini in City Press, 29 July 1984
- 12 H Barnabas in the Graphic, 11 May 1984
- 13 City Press, 27 May 1984
- 14 See Bendix article, 'Trade Union Developments'
- 15 Director General of Manpower, Dr Piet van der Merwe, Rand Daily Mail, 1 August 1984
- 16 A Levy, forthcoming IRD Strike Survey, reviewed in Business Day, Rand Daily Mail, 9 April 1984
- 17 Van der Merwe, op cit
- 18 Final DOM figures as recorded in IIR Review of Industrial Relations in SA 1983: 44
- 19 IIR Review of Industrial Relations in SA 1982: 9/11
- 20 Hansard 21 January 1984, Questions: Col 274
- 21 AAC Review of Industrial Relations in SA 1983:18
- 22 DOM monthly strike breakdown derived from final 336 strike count, IIR op cit: 44
- 23 A Levy, 'Silliness over Strikes', Financial Mail 17 February 1984:48

24 SAIRR Annual Survey of Race Relations 1983:206

25 Although the accuracy of the DOM comparison between the first five months of 1983 and 1984 is questionable - as discussed above - according to the same figures, the average duration of strikes rose to 2.6 days over January - May this year. Also AAC op cit: 16

26 S Bendix, 'Industrial Relations Review 1983 and Prognosis 1984', SA Industrial Relations Journal Vol 4 No 1: 36

27 A Levy, 'Unfair Dismissals: A Guide for SA Managment', book reviewed in Sunday times 27 May 1984

28 Hansard 21 February 1984, Questions: Col 274

29 IRD Special Report June 1983: 3

30 Bendix op cit

31 See joint union statement of 7 February 1984, in L van Schalkwyk, 'The New Income Tax Act: Why The Fuss?', Indicator SA Issue Focus, February 1984

32 The new income tax dispensation was cited as a contributory reason for a SAAWU stoppage at Wayne Rubber (Isipingo) in mid-January 1984, followed by a tax strike by the SAAWU-formed Baking and Allied Workers' Union at Union Flour Mills (Durban) in early March

33 Bendix op cit 23/24

34 Ibid 24

35 IRD op cit 6

36 Ibid 6

37 FOSATU Annual Report 1983: 6

38 Izwelethu (CUSA Newsletter) Nov/Dec 1983

PART TWO

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REVIEW 1983

By Sonia Bendix of Industrial Relations Trends Consultants (IRTC)

Edited by Graham Howe

1 Introduction

The year 1983 proved to be one of the most interesting years for industrial relations since the inception of the new labour dispensation in 1979. If 1982 was the year in which the labour movement representing black workers clearly established itself, then 1983 may well become known as the year in which the statutory collective bargaining system was tried and tested by unions as well as management. Unfair labour practices and the various issues raised in terms of this definition undoubtedly became the focal point of labour relations in 1983.

Initially, emergent black trade unions were mainly intent on establishing presence and subsequently, on increasing wage packets. Black employees have since become increasingly 'conscientised'. In 1983, this was reflected in worker demands not only for substantive gains in wages, but also for security of employment, dignity in the workplace, fair labour practices and for greater control of their 'working lives' in general (see table 4). These causes have been readily taken up by unions on the workers' behalf.

The fact that even in recession, membership of emergent trade unions continued to grow and many disputes between employers and organised black workers occurred, demonstrates the extent to which the new labour movement is the effective force in industrial relations. Serious disputes at last year's annual conference of the Trade Union Council of SA (TUCSA) and the subsequent disaffiliation of several unions (see section 4) suggest that an eventual realignment of some established and emergent trade unions might occur.

A growing preference for negotiation as a first course of action may be attributed to the growing professionalism of unions and to a more realistic self-assessment of their power base in the context of recession. Where deadlock did occur, numerous unions used the statutory

conflict arbitration mechanisms rather than immediately resorting to 'illegal' strike action. An increasing number of 'unfair labour practice' (ULP) disputes were declared and later brought into the Industrial Court (see table 8). In 1983, a total of 190 cases were referred to the Industrial Court, of which 22 were new ULP cases and 10 were ULP cases carried over from 1982.¹ Recently, some unions have also used the official dispute settling machinery as a vehicle towards legal strike action.²

2 Collective Bargaining Structures

Over the past year, the relevance of Industrial Councils (ICs) as negotiating bodies continued to decline. It is in the interests of all parties involved to ensure that the centralised IC system does not overly clash with localised, plant-level bargaining mechanisms. In the long term, however, the establishment of feasible, revised collective bargaining structures remains complicated by the segmented and multifaceted nature of the trade union movement.

ICs granted numerous requests made by employers for check-off facilities on behalf of non-party unions and for exemptions from closed shop agreements. In addition, some ICs have streamlined their dispute-settling procedures and made it easier for plant-level disputes to be processed by the council machinery.

As far as the newer unions are concerned, the most significant indications of a more pragmatic approach to official collective bargaining structures was the decision of the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU) to join the IC for the Metal Industry, provided its participation did not preclude further plant-level bargaining with individual employers. The South African Allied Workers' Union's (SAAWU) acceptance of observer status on the Industrial Council for the Explosives Industry was another important development.³

After council negotiations, MAWU expressed its dissatisfaction with opportunities to report back to its members and also declared several disputes with employers. In 1983, it became evident that the policies and strategies of some of the newer unions are still too closely focussed on 'participatory democratic' practices to allow solely for highly centralised forms of bargaining. Should joint employer negotiations with these unions be desired, perhaps smaller, more localised structures would be a preferable alternative to complement plant-level bargaining.

Industrial Council or Plant-level Bargaining?

The realisation has dawned that numerous ICs have assumed more the role of administrative bodies than of hard negotiating parties and most councils are no longer representative.⁴ Although the Department of Manpower has attempted to use this unrepresentativeness to curtail the extension of agreements (see section 6), in the process it may be undercutting the IC's very reason for existence: the setting and policing of minimum wages, standards and conditions of employment, in the absence of comprehensive national legislative measures for this purpose.

South African industrial relations are in a state of transition. Until such time as the necessary adaptation of the statutory collective bargaining system is undertaken, a complete undermining of the IC system is neither feasible nor desirable.

No fewer than 50 new plant-level recognition agreements were reported to have been concluded during 1983 (see table 7), in addition to the approximately 300 agreements in operation at the end of 1982. By contrast, only 104 IC agreements were in existence by the end of 1983. However, these cover more than a million workers, whereas recognition agreements concluded at plant level cover perhaps one tenth of this number of workers.

IC protagonists claim that the sheer enormity of attempting to cover the same number of workers by plant-level agreements mitigates against the latter system. Nevertheless, plant-level agreements have proliferated and by virtue of greater management and union experience, have become most effective in regulating industrial conflict. Many now contain well-planned and practicable grievance, disciplinary, retrenchment and dispute-settling procedures.

3 Industrial Relations Issues

During 1983, the demand for higher wages in general and particularly the Federation of South African Trade Union (FOSATU) campaign for a 'living wage' appears, not by worker volition, but by circumstantial necessity, to have shifted to the background. However, random wage related unrest and disputes did occur quite frequently in the second half of last year (see table 4).⁵

The very real threat of unemployment in an economic recession inhibited many union demands and centralised wage negotiations in the major

Table 7

**RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS REPORTED TO
HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED DURING 1983**

UNION	COMPANY
African Food and Canning Workers Union — (unaffiliated)	• Attwells Bakery
Bakery and Allied Workers Union — (SAAWU)	• Park Bakery (Fedbake)
Chemical Workers Industrial Union — (FOSATU)	• Duropenta (AECI subsidiary) • Plate Glass (Germiston) • Shatterprufe Safety Glass (Pretoria and Port Elizabeth)
Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa — (unaffiliated)	• Woolworths • O K Bazaars • C N A • Foschini Group
Federated Mining Union — (associated with Boilermakers)	• Matthey Rustenburg Refineries
Food and Beverage Workers Union — (CUSA)	• Simba Quix • Premier Milling (Newton) • Maizecor Industries
General Workers Union — (unaffiliated)	• Industrial Sands
Metal and Allied Workers Union — (FOSATU)	• Bay Stone Minerals • Reliable Products (Group 5) • C I Industries • Mather and Platt (Elandsfontein) • Scottish Cables • C Y C Steel • B M R • Dunlop (Durban) • Thos Barlow • Prestige (Pietermaritzburg)
National Automobile and Allied Workers Union — (FOSATU)	• BMW (S A) • Autoplastics
National Iron Steel Metal and Allied Workers Union — (associated with National Federation of Workers)	• Bay Stone Minerals • Richards Bay Minerals
National Sugar and Refining and Allied Industries Employees Union — (formerly NUSMRE — unaffiliated)	• Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors
National Union of Mineworkers — (CUSA)	• Chamber of Mines: three agreements covering several gold mines, collieries and other affiliates • Rand Mines' Douglas Colliery (Van Dyk's Drift Section) • Goldfields of South Africa (Kloof Mine) • Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Limited Elandsrand Mine, Vaal Reef East and West Mines, ►

Table 7 continued

UNION	COMPANY
	President Brand Mine, Free State Saaiplaas Mine, Welkom Holdings Division Mine, Western Deep Level Hospital • Chamber of Mines Rand Refinery, TEBA Records Department, sports club, Rand Mutual Hospital
National Union of Textile Workers — (FOSATU)	• Tongaat Textiles • Braitex
Paper Wood and Allied Workers Union (FOSATU)	• Nampak Conical, Nampak Sacks, Nampak Cores and Tubes • Carlton Paper Corporation (Wadeville) • Uniply • Mondi Paper Mill (Felixton) • Golden Era Stationers
Printing and Allied Workers' Union — (SAAWU)	• Ozalid (Pty) Limited
South African Allied Workers Union — (unaffiliated)	• Defy Corporation • Wireohm • Union Flour Milling
Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union — (FOSATU)	• C G Smith Sugar • Imbali Beer Brewery • Congella Brewery • Cato Ridge Abattoir
Transport and Allied Workers Union — (CUSA)	• Vaal Transport
Transport and General Workers Union — (FOSATU)	• Putco • Anglo American Property Services (Johannesburg, Pretoria, Benoni) • Freight Forwarding
SOURCES Bendix (IRTC) Review of Industrial Relations op cit IIR Review of Industrial Relations op cit	

industries proved to be an anti-climax. In most cases, the unions capitulated and settled for increases closer to the employer offer than to the original employee demand. However, the hiatus in the wage push was utilised to focus attention on other worker issues.

Retrenchments and Dismissals

It was inevitable that arbitrary hiring and firing practices would sooner or later come under the spotlight. Individual dismissals were often interpreted by workers as victimisation of certain employees or in procedure, as an unfair labour practice.

At plant level, various solutions have been sought to the conflict aroused by summary dismissals of striking workers and by the selective re-employment practices of management. Negotiated agreements allow for a dismissal-free period, usually ranging from 12 to 36 hours or, in some cases, management undertake to dismiss and rehire either all or none of the strikers. Growing dissatisfaction is being expressed at the fact that employers may summarily dismiss legal strikers too. Unions argue that there is no advantage to be gained in utilising official machinery, if the repercussions are essentially the same as those which obtain in the case of an illegal strike.

Racism and Sexism

Another issue which was raised with greater frequency during 1983 was the 'unfair' treatment of workers, particularly as regards derogatory attitudes held by supervisory management. The typical response of management has been that the problem is essentially one of ensuring fair treatment, while not encroaching too greatly on the authority of line management and principles of management prerogatives in general. However, this balancing act becomes complex in the context of inter-personal relationships, culturally established behaviour patterns and interracial tensions.

Not unexpectedly, female employees are becoming increasingly 'conscientised' and may yet prove to be a potent force in the industrial relations constellation. This process was probably accentuated after black, married females became subject to the same, higher taxes as their white counterparts, under the new Income Tax Act, since 1 March 1984.⁶ Apart from normal issues of wages and working conditions, female workers have initially concentrated on such matters as 'unfair' treatment, dignity in the workplace and maternity leave/benefits.

Industrial Health Legislation

The issue of industrial health gained prominence with the passage of the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act No 6 of 1983, with its controversial provision for safety representatives. In two instances, in the explosives and mining industries, employees refused to continue working under conditions they believed to be unsafe. The IC granted Status Quo Orders to dismissed strikers in one of these cases, raising the question as to the measures required of management to assure workers of safety in the workplace.

The campaign for safe working conditions was also intensified in the textile and asbestos manufacturing industries. In the former industry, unions have instituted a streamlined programme to monitor cotton dust level in factories and to test employees for 'brown lung' disease. The imminent advent of shop floor safety representation has motivated many unions, including some from the established ranks, to commence safety education programmes for officials and shop stewards. Some federations already have well-established safety committees comprised of both union representatives and medical specialists.

Overtime and Pensions

One of the issues to raise its head during 1983 was the question of overtime (see table 4). The issue of overtime is essentially a collective one, a stand initiated by unions rather than individual workers, as demonstrated recently in Britain.

One facet of the unions' arguments rests on the assumption that a cut in overtime will raise employment levels. Although this tends to ignore the more practical aspects of an enterprise's operations, it was often adopted as a stand against overtime while retrenchments in general were on the increase. On the micro-level, it appears as if workers increasingly view overtime as an exploitative practice, whereby employers justify low wages with the promise of extra earnings.

The pensions issue continues to intermittently raise its head, though sometimes in a different form to that experienced in 1981.⁷ In the metal industry, history was made when unions were given representation on the board governing the industry's pension fund for the first time. The thrust is essentially for worker control of funds and for the exclusive application of such funds for the improvement of black living standards.

Worker Politics and Social Issues

Finally, the question will inevitably be raised as to whether socio-political issues have significantly affected the conduct of industrial relations. This has become a somewhat hackneyed debate and it would appear that on all sides, the drum of worker politics is being excessively thumped, to divert attention from other more immediate, practical issues - the business of accommodating the basic management/worker conflict.

So far, management and unions have brought pure politics into industrial relations and onto the shop floor only on rare occasions. One such occasion was the threat of a white mineworker strike in protest at the deracialisation of the statutory collective bargaining system. Another example is found in the support of some employers for the new constitution (through signing 'yes' referendum petitions), and in FOSATU's retaliatory anti-referendum pamphlet campaign.

Most 'political' demands have taken the form of worker requests for employers to intervene with government on their behalf, in order to solve socio-economic problems, such as housing, transport and influx control. A significant event in 1983 was the Rikhotso judgement, an apparent step towards the improvement of both racial and industrial relations. However, the extent of its impact will ultimately depend on government interpretation of the judgement and on the subsequent revision of influx control measures in the 'Koornhof Bills'.

4 Trade Union Developments

Within the emergent trade union movement, there were no dramatic developments during 1983 and affiliations remained basically the same. Unions belonging to FOSATU were again the most successful in terms of the number of recognition agreements concluded, with MAWU in the lead (see table 7).

New Union Unity Moves

Although various unity meetings were convened during the year and a feasibility committee was established to examine the possibility of a new federation, several stumbling blocks on the path to unity existed.⁸ These include the problems of union structure, demarcation, inter-union rivalry, representation, access to membership figures, outside funding and general ideological and policy differences. A significant divide remains between the industrially-based, pragmatic unions and the more general, populist unions linked to community groups.

Unions in the FOSATU fold and the General Workers' Union (GWU) consistently refused to align themselves to any political groupings, whereas SAAWU and the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) affiliated to the United Democratic Front, launched in mid 1983. CUSA also took part in the formation of the National Forum Committee (NFC) last year and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) actively supported the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), a key NFC constituent.

TUCSA

In the ranks of the more established Trade Union Council of South Africa the question of unity became a pressing problem at its annual conference in September. Since then, six unions have disaffiliated from TUCSA for a combination of reasons, stemming from conference proposals to make dealings with unregistered unions illegal; to appeal to government to reconsider the new Constitution; and to raise affiliation fees. These unions, with membership figures given in brackets, were the SA Boilermakers' Union (29 877), SA Footplate Staff Association (9 810), Witwatersrand Liquor and Catering Trades Employees' Union (1 270), SA Woodworkers' Union (1 789), Witwatersrand Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade Union (1 270) and the Concession Stores and Allied Trades Assistants' Union (370).⁹

FOSATU

FOSATU appeared to concentrate its resources on building up its less successful unions. This proved to be a sound strategy, since the more established of the newer unions had to concentrate on holding ground, whereas the smaller unions were able to use opportunities for new recruitment. Thus unions such as the Paper Wood and Allied Workers' Union (PWAU), the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) and the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) came more into their own in 1983 (See tables 5 and 7). In general, FOSATU unions have increased their expertise in negotiation skills and in the use of all available bargaining avenues, drawing on a stock of strong legal and economic advisors.

Unions in Retail/Mining Industries

During 1983, the most significant union growth to occur was in the retail and mining industries. Two unions, the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa (CCAWUSA) and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) achieved quite phenomenal success. CCAWUSA continued to sign up the head offices of large retailers, marking its progress by intermittent and newsworthy strikes. It has succeeded in reaching relatively favourable agreements with employers, which often cover employees throughout the country. This union has also taken the lead in the battle for the maternity rights of female employees.

NUM's strategy, on the other hand, centred on publicity gained from repeatedly threatened disputes and on the obviously charismatic leadership of General Secretary Mr Cyril Ramaphosa. Its rapid conclusion of recognition agreements was naturally watched with keen interest, owing to the prominent position of mining in South Africa, the novelty of black unionism on the mines, the traditional volatility of the industry's labour force, and the possibility of a white worker backlash.¹⁰

What is remarkable about NUM and CCAWUSA is that although they recruit at shop floor or mine-level, both conduct central negotiations with the Chamber of Mines and company head offices respectively, and have rapidly achieved a dominant position in very large industries. The 55 000 member-strong NUM has significantly boosted the image of CUSA. Last year, other unions in the CUSA fold were also more active at shop floor level than before, particularly the Building Construction and Allied Workers' Union (BCAWU) and the SA Chemical Workers' Union (SACWU) (see tables 5 and 7).

CUSA unions have adopted the novel strategy of recruiting and signing up contract workers at labour recruitment points in the homelands. However, CUSA has not yet overtaken FOSATU in terms of industrial successes (see table 5). The strongest member union, excluding NUM, still appears to be the Steel Engineering and Allied Workers' Union (SEAWU) and the Food and Beverage Workers' Union (FBWU), whose position is continually being challenged by FOSATU's Sweet Food and Allied Workers' Union (SFAWU).

Established Independents

Without much publicity, the African Food and Canning Workers' Union (AFCWU) has rapidly expanded into sectors other than the canning and food processing industries, its traditional stronghold. It has achieved marked success, particularly in the grain milling industry and is probably the strongest of the newer unions. Its sphere of influence has extended from the Western Cape to the Transvaal and Eastern Cape. The AFCWU is reported to have more than 45 recognition agreements in the latter area.

The General Workers' Union (GWU) has become more pragmatic and appears to be moving away from its previous stance of being merely an advisory and back-up service to worker committees recognised by management. In short, it is acting more as a union and its recognition agreements submitted to management have changed accordingly.

SAAWU ranks high in the strike stakes for 1983 (see table 5) and has achieved a number of new recognition agreements, the most notable being with the Defy Corporation. It has also intensified its recruitment drive in the Transvaal, where it has approached a number of employers.

Some Newer Unions

The year 1983 also saw the more frequent appearance of smaller, hitherto relatively unknown unions, such as the National General Workers' Union (NGWU), the National Federation of Workers (NFW), the African Allied Workers' Union (AAWU) and others. Whether these unions will eventually establish themselves remains to be seen. One newer union which has achieved much publicity, but little material success, is the Insurance and Assurance Workers' Union of South Africa (IAWUSA). It has strong AZAPO backing, but has selected a difficult industry to organise.

In the western Cape, interesting new developments took place, particularly in the textile and clothing industries. FOSATU's National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) has built a bridgehead in the area. The monopolistic position of the Garment Workers' Union of the Western Province (GWU-WP) is being challenged by the newly formed, unaffiliated Clothing Workers' Union (CLOWU). The western Cape region is perhaps entering the growth phase in unionisation experienced in the Transvaal and Natal about two years ago.

5 Industrial Court Disputes

The sharp rise in applications for conciliation boards and the increased popularity of the Industrial Court were hailed in some quarters as proof that the official dispute-settling machinery is becoming more attractive to members of the emergent labour movement. During 1983, 190 cases were referred to the Industrial Court, as compared to 49 in 1982. One hundred and nineteen conciliation boards were appointed in 1983 in comparison with 60 the previous year.¹¹

The initial impetus for the switch to Industrial Court actions or the declaration of official disputes was to be found in the decreasing feasibility of strike action for unions and workers, rather than in a sudden attraction to the legal and official machinery. However, the very fact that previous ideological opposition to ICs as part of the 'system' was set aside, furnishes proof of a greater pragmatism on the part of the newer unions.

The 'Unfair Labour Practice' Debate

Last year, particularly among employers, the use of the Industrial Court by unions and some of the judgements arising from such actions have aroused much controversy. Management has commonly argued that the resolution of disputes should essentially depend on the respective plant-level bargaining positions of the parties, yet have been brought as 'actions' against them in the Industrial Court. In part, this situation would seem to have arisen from the lack of differentiation between disputes of 'rights' and of interests, the confusion of the legal with conciliatory and bargaining machinery, and in particular, with the 'non-definitive' concept of an 'unfair labour practice'.

Industrial Court actions during the year concerned such varying issues as retrenchments, individual dismissals, restoration of bargaining structures, recognition of representative unions, retrenchments of migrants, defamatory remarks and even UIF deductions (see table 8). During 1983, the full effect of the power to grant Status Quo Orders, which was transferred to the Industrial Court in December 1982, was perceived in industrial relations circles, as unions used the provision to its fullest extent.

Many employers were especially perturbed by attempts to prove that failure to recognise a representative union or to bargain 'in good faith' constituted an unfair labour practice. In 1983, a common call from management emerged for a rethink on the 'unfair labour practice' concept and for clearer guidelines as to the procedures they are expected to follow.¹²

Legal Strike Action

During the latter half of 1983, some unions used ICs and Conciliation Boards not as a means of access to the Industrial Court, but as an avenue towards legal strike action. The NUTW initiated the first legal strike and a number of official disputes were also declared by MAWU, which did not fall under the unfair labour practice definition and thus raised the possibility of legal strike action. There are indications that these unions will increasingly test the official dispute-settling machinery, particularly as regards employer dismissals of legal strikers.

The numerous problems within the current framework of collective bargaining notwithstanding, the noticeably increased use of official avenues may eventually have a stabilising effect on industrial relations. At the very least, avenues of dispute other than illegal strike action have been tested. However, this does not necessarily imply that workers and unions will not resort to more frequent plant-

level action once their power base improves, particularly since workers may then become impatient with delays in settling disputes at more centralised levels.

6 The Government and Legislation

Stricter application of the provisions for the submission of information and records by unregistered unions points to an increasing tendency on the part of the Department of Manpower to attempt to exert influence over the 'informal' system. In terms of the Labour Relations Amendment Bill reintroduced in parliament in June 1984, plant-level recognition agreements between unregistered trade unions and employers will only be enforceable in the courts (including the Industrial Court), if unions submit copies thereof and additional information to the Department, in terms of the old Labour Relations Act.¹³

As far as the 'formal' or statutory collective bargaining system is concerned, greater concern was displayed about the effectiveness of the system, demonstrated by the Industrial Council 'indaba' organised by the Department of Manpower towards the end of last year. On the other hand, the Department increasingly attempted to veto the extension of agreements where either the party trade unions or the employer organisations were not sufficiently representative.

Of the revisions promulgated in the Labour Relations Amendment Bill of 1 May 1983, the most significant were the provisions allowing for access to Conciliation Boards by unregistered unions and for the unilateral appointment of Conciliation Boards by the Minister. A few unregistered unions, notably GWU, have so far utilised the Conciliation Board machinery, but mainly for the purpose of declaring unfair labour practice disputes.

In the Labour Relations Amendment Bill of August 1983, it was proposed that the power to grant exemptions from IC decisions should again revert to the Minister. Another proposal is that, for the first time, parties to IC agreements should be allowed to seek exemption from such agreements. Two other important pieces of legislation presented were the Basic Conditions of Employment Act No 3 of 1983 and the controversial Machinery and Occupational Safety Act No 6 of 1983 (see section 3).¹⁴ The changing constellations of industrial relations continue to reveal inadequacies in the present legislative framework, necessitating constant amendment.

7 Sectoral and Regional Strike Distribution

Strikes by Sector

During 1983, the engineering industry experienced the most strikes for the second year in succession. This is undoubtedly related to the fact that it is the second largest industrial sector after the mining industry.

However, the distribution of strike activity across the various industrial sectors in 1983 depicted in table 9 differs significantly from the pattern for 1982. During 1983, the retail, food and beverage industries were the most hit by strike action, whereas in 1982, more than 50 percent of all strikes took place in the metal, motor and textile industries.

This changing pattern of strike activity refutes the commonly accepted notion of certain industries being intrinsically more strike-prone. It is obvious that other factors such as trade union recruitment drives, changing strategies and management attitudes and practices in specific companies also play a role in determining the sectoral distribution of strikes.

In comparison to 1982, table 9 reveals strike activity across a wider spread of industries as well as a shift of emphasis to smaller industries such as the retail, paper, wood, hotel and catering sectors, during 1983. Among other factors, the untargeted state of certain 'non-unionised' industries, the differential impact of economic conditions, and the high consumer profile of some companies, partly explain why some sectors were relatively high on the strike list for 1983.

Strikes by Region

Table 10 reflects that in contrast to 1982, there were no regional or localised surges of labour activity during 1983, with a noticeable decrease of strike activity in the eastern Cape. On the other hand, the bulk of strike actions continued to be concentrated in the Transvaal industrial centre (see appendix 2). Otherwise, no signs of significantly increased strike activity were recorded for the remaining geographical areas.

On the whole, there was no evidence of concerted trade union activity by region or industry, with the possible exception of the retail sector. On the whole, labour action during 1983 lacked direction, drive and concentration, the marked features of union activity in early 1982.

<p>Table 8 SIGNIFICANT actual & proposed INDUSTRIAL COURT ACTIONS 1982-1984</p>				
RESPONDENT	APPLICANT	BASIS	ALLEGATION	OUTCOME
Vleissentraal	SFAWU	Dismissal of 30 workers after stoppage	Victimisation of union members	Out of Court settlement. Company agreed to reinstatement
Triomf Fertilizer	SACWU	Retrenchment of 60 workers	Victimisation of workers committee	Out of Court settlement
Turnell S.A.	SAAWU	Selective re-employment of dismissed strikers	Victimisation	Out of Court settlement
Master Diamond Cutters Association	SADWU	Stipulation for Association to act as sole labour broker in the industry	Practice was freezing labour mobility	Court declared it to be an unfair labour practice.
ISCOR	BAWU	Unauthorised deductions		Court ordered employers to refund an amount of R28 000
STOBAR	MAWU	Dismissal of strikers after alleged go-slow	Disguised retrenchment. Failure to follow accepted dismissal procedures of Industrial Council	Court ordered reinstatement. Company paid out R38 000
Industrial Council for the Furniture Industry and NUF AW	Grafton Everest	Closed shop with National Union of Furniture and Allied Workers	Failure by Industrial Council to grant exemption to 3 workers who refused to join NUF AW constituted an unfair labour practice	Court ruled that Grafton should first bring dispute to Industrial Council or appeal to the Minister against the Council's decision
Argus	SASJ	Decision by employees to discontinue bargaining in central forum	Refusal to bargain in manner which had become established practice	Court ordered reversion to Status Quo. The employers were, therefore, obliged to continue bargaining on the informal conciliation board
Dunswart Iron and Steel	MAWU	Retrenchment of migrant workers		Settled before going to Court. Company paid out R500 each. (a total of R34 500) to the workers
S.A. Fabrics	NUTW	Retrenchment of Workers	Failure to give adequate notice of retrenchment, to provide severance pay and to negotiate on retrenchments	Out of Court settlement for R16 000
Braitex	NUTW	Company's unilateral decision on wages and bonuses. Refusal to negotiate	Unfair labour practice not to recognise and negotiate with a representative union	Out of Court settlement was made an order of the Court. The company agreed to pay R40 000 compensation to workers and to recognise the union which achieved majority in a secret ballot
Alfa Romeo	NAAWU	Company's evident reluctance to recognise union. Retrenchment of workers, including union officials	Blocking of union representation. Victimisation of union members through retrenchment	Settled in Italy before court action. NAAWU to be granted recognition. One union official reinstated

RESPONDENT	APPLICANT	BASIS	ALLEGATION	OUTCOME
Frametex	NUTW	Rivalry between NUTW (FOSATU) and TWIU (TUCSA). Frame's granting of stop-order facilities to TWIU	Favouritism for TWIU. Victimisation of NUTW members. Failure to deal with representative union	Status Quo Order restraining Frame from recognising TWIU or granting it facilities not available to NUTW. Order later lapsed. Industrial Court refused to extend it. NUTW appealed to Supreme Court, but matter settled before Supreme Court action. Conciliation Board later appointed
Fry's Metals	Workers belonging to SAAWU	4 Workers dismissed after refusal to work overtime and to report to manager	Failure to follow agreed disciplinary procedure — unfair dismissal	Status Quo Order granted
Fodens	UAMAWU	Retrenchment of 3 workers. Union's unsuccessful attempts to negotiate. Friction between supervisors and workers	Refusal to negotiate with a representative union. Interference with the freedom of association. Use of derogatory terms. Failure to provide guarantee against victimisation. Failure to introduce grievance and disciplinary procedures. Inadequate retrenchment procedures, etc.	Company agreed beforehand not to continue practices, to commence negotiations and to repay all UIF money. Court ruled in the 'abstract' that in Foden's 'particular' circumstances, most of the practices were unfair
Servix	EIWU	Dismissal of two employees who had complained to the Industrial Council about deductions for lost tools	Victimisation. Wrong reasons for dismissal given on UIF card	Pre-settlement made an Order of the Court. Company to show 'retrenchment' as cause of dismissal and to pay R5 000
B & S Engineering	MAWU	Dismissal and 'selective' re-employment of workers after a 'strike' the previous year	Utilisation of dismissal to get rid of union members. Therefore victimisation. Workers not given a fair hearing. Failure to negotiate with representative union	Out of Court settlement. Company agreed to pay substantial sum to 249 workers not re-employed
Barlows Manufacturing (Kew)	MAWU	Dismissal of 12 workers after a strike	Victimisation	Barlows requested right to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Industrial Court's right to grant Status Quo Orders where normal notice had been given. Appeal refused. Case pending
Plaza Engineering	GWU	Retrenchment of 16 workers	Failure to negotiate on retrenchments and to follow procedures.	Court refused to grant a Status Quo Order since no agreed procedures existed. Company, however, offered to make ex gratia repayment
Bonus Fertilizer	CWIU	Dismissal of workers after supposed strike	Lock-out by employer. Disguised retrenchment	Out of Court settlement. Company agreed to pay R25 000 and re-employ 30 of the workers

RESPONDENT	APPLICANT	BASIS	ALLEGATION	OUTCOME
West Driefontein	NUM	Dismissal of workers who had refused to go underground until assured that mine was safe	Unfair to dismiss workers if no 'reasonable' assurance has been given	Court ordered re-instatement of the 17 workers
Frametex	NUTW	Retrenchment of 10 workers	Retrenchments not negotiated. LIFO principle not applied. Migrants retrenched before expiry of their contract	Status Quo Order granted. Seen as indication that the Court regards negotiation and the LIFO principle as important
The Star	MWASA	Dismissal of workers two days after a strike about an individual dismissal	Dismissed workers not given individual hearings. Reason for dismissal not supplied. Company had no right to dismiss since strike was 'justifiable'	Application dismissed
O'Kiep Copper Mine	MWU	Termination of closed shop, extended agreement with AEU. Second case over employee's dismissal for negligence	Denies employees' choice of union. Fired worker not present at subsequent disciplinary hearing	AEU members able to simultaneously belong to other unions. Companies should have fair, comprehensive disciplinary and appeal procedures
AECI	WAHL (Individual Action)	Summary dismissal of employee	Application for reinstatement in terms of Section 43 of Labour Relations Act	Employee to be suspended for one month, as summary dismissal too harsh
Daily Dispatch	SASJ	Dispute over alleged refusal to bargain	Charge that this constitutes an unfair labour practice (ULP)	Minister of Manpower appointed board, but refused to include ULP allegation in its ambit, thus preventing issue from reaching Industrial Court
Frame	NUTW	Retrenchment of 10 employees, in one case for refusing a transfer, and company's refusal to recognise representative union	Both issues constitute ULPs	Employees temporarily reinstated and conciliation board appointed. All suspensions/terminations covered by definition of 'dispute' in provision, including retrenchment/redundancy. Advocated general guidelines for retrenchment, including consultation with worker representatives over criteria for selection of workers to be retrenched; sufficient prior warning and considering ways to avoid retrenchment through transfers, eliminating overtime, working short-time, etc (See above, earlier NUTW/Frame case)

RESPONDENT	APPLICANT	BASIS	ALLEGATION	OUTCOME
Pest Control Transvaal Ltd	SACWU	Summary dismissal of 5 workers over clock-card misconduct	Employees not afforded opportunity to oppose allegation at proper enquiry	Employees temporarily reinstated under unfair dismissal section. As Conciliation Board terms of reference excluded the ULP allegation, union was prevented from taking further Industrial Court action.
OK Hyperama	CCAWUSA	Dismissal of 180 workers on strike to protest dismissal of shop steward	Initial dismissal constitutes an ULP	Union withdrew court action
Fodens SA	UMAMWU	Union costs incurred in landmark Industrial Court case (mid-1983) which established 37 ULPs	Union appeals to Supreme Court to grant costs against Fodens	Supreme Court ruled that the Industrial Court has no power to grant costs, as it does not function as a court when considering ULPs in terms of Section 46(9) of the Labour Relations Act. Further appeal to Appellate Division pending
MAWU	Brollo Africa (Barlow Rand)	Strike over deadlocked wage talks and union overtime ban	Company alleged that all 'illegal strikes' are ULPs	Negotiations reopened before going to court
PUTCO	TGWU/TAWU	Seven month old wage dispute. Arbitrator appointed	Unions unable to go on strike because passenger transport is an 'essential service'	A 15.5% across-the-board wage increase was awarded to 8 000 PUTCO workers, with 6% interest on backpay
	Master Diamond Cutters Association	Competition between skilled white union members and semi-skilled coloured/Asian workers	ULP, as demarcation agreement between union and employers had lapsed in 1982	Absence of demarcation not an ULP
McKinnon Chain	MAWU	Employers' insistence on negotiating wages directly at Industrial Council level	Union to ask Court 'to rule that it is unfair for an employer to refuse to bargain over wages with a majority union outside an official Industrial Council'	Threatened MAWU action
Vetsak (Isando)	MAWU	Dismissal of 272 workers after a work stoppage related to recognition, stop order and wage demands. 61% of group later rehired	Selective rehiring constitutes an ULP	Application by two workers for temporary reinstatement refused. Court ruled that dismissal was justified and that the selective re-employment of some of the workers was a separate issue. Final determination pending

RESPONDENT	APPLICANT	BASIS	ALLEGATION	OUTCOME
African Cables	EAWU	Dismissal of 500 workers after dispute over changed work week and attempted extraction of worker commitment not to participate in 'illegal' strikes	Inadequate consultation; threat of dismissal where workers were required to sign new contract of employment an ULP; and immediate recruitment of new labour pre-empts negotiation process	324 workers to be temporarily reinstated with back pay and benefits accrued over previous 3 months. Indicates that Court does not regard mass dismissal and/or factor of replacement labour as an appropriate solution to industrial unrest
Cape Textile Industry's Industrial Council	NUTW	Industrial Council refusal to allow non-member NUTW to have union dues deducted by employers	The right of an Industrial Council to prevent unions which are not Industrial Council members to have stop order facility	Industrial Council right upheld by Industrial Court. NUTW Supreme Court action pending
Auto Industrial	UAMAWU	Company's failure to implement Industrial Court order to reinstate eight dismissed shop stewards with all benefits and backpay. Second case involves 23 separate ULPs related to dismissals	Actions of 3 directors in contempt of Court's decision	Determination pending
Uniply (Barlow Rand)	PWAWU	Dismissal of 400 workers on go-slow protest after sacking of two shop stewards who participated in a May Day demonstration	Victimisation of union members and improper dismissal inquiry/ procedures	Judgement deferred
GWIU/Natal Clothing Industrial Council	NUTW	Refusal of Industrial Council membership (where GWIU is sole union member) to NUTW, on grounds of insufficient representation in industry	Appeal for order to either grant Industrial Council membership or exemption from GWIU/employer closed shop agreement, which enables GWIU to prevent employment of non-GWIU members. A ballot held at the plant where NUTW (FOSATU)/ GWIU (TUCSA) rivalry exists showed 30% support for the former union	Case continues
Rainbow Chickens (Hammarisdale)	Legal Resources Centre (Durban)	Dismissal of 7 workers for refusing to work overtime	Dismissal constituted an ULP, as 'agricultural' workers in this case were actually 'industrial' workers and therefore entitled to both protection under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and to access to the Industrial Court itself	Court agreed to definition of status and granted a reinstatement order. (Conciliation Board was subsequently appointed as the company opted to pay backpay and redundancy compensation rather than reinstating the 7 workers)

RESPONDENT	APPLICANT	BASIS	ALLEGATION	OUTCOME
Industrial/ Supreme Court	NUTW/Frame	(See preceding developments, two cases above) ongoing retrenchment/ recognition dispute at Conciliation Board, Industrial and Supreme Court levels	In response to an application by Frame, the Supreme Court upheld an Industrial Court decision that labour practices may be regarded as 'unfair' if they disrupt industrial relations, and not only if they break the law. This judgement in turn enabled the union to take the recognition issue to the Industrial Court. However, the company was later given leave to appeal against the former Supreme Court judgement and the legal tussle continues	The NUTW is to ask the Supreme Court to overrule the Minister of Manpower's decision to exclude an ULP allegation from a Conciliation Board's ambit on the retrenchment issue, thereby denying union access to the Industrial Court

SOURCES
Bendix (IRTC) Review of Industrial Relations op cit
IIR Monthly Information Sheets
IRD Bi-Monthly publication
Indicator Project SA Press Clippings

Table 9

● **SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF STRIKE ACTIONS, 1983** ●

	NO. OF STRIKES	% OF TOTAL
Engineering	40	21,0
Retail	30	15,8
Food and Beverage	25	13,2
Glass, Paint and Chemical	15	7,9
Wood and Paper	14	7,3
Manufacture of Building Materials	14	7,3
Textiles	9	4,7
Storage and Transport	8	4,2
Hotel and Catering	7	3,7
General Manufacturing	6	3,2
Mining	6	3,2
Motor	5	2,6
Municipality & Services	3	1,6
Insurance	2	1,1
Building	2	1,1
Laboratories	2	1,1
Newspaper and Printing	1	,5
Security	1	,5
TOTAL	190	100,0

SOURCE: Bondix (IRTC) Review of Industrial Relations op cit

Table 10

● **REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF STRIKES, 1983** ●

Percentage of total strikes

	NMC (1982)	IIR (1983)
PWV	52,8	75,5
Natal	12,7	11,7
Eastern Cape	15,2	7,1
Rest of Transvaal		2,6
Western Cape	1,3	2,0
Orange Free State	0,5	1,0
Kimberley	0,3	
Rest of RSA	17,3	

SOURCE: IIR Review of Industrial Relations op cit

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Rand Daily Mail 19 May 1984
- 2 See complete list of legal strikes, Conclusion of preceding article by G Howe
- 3 FOSATU's National Union of Textile Workers had already expressed its willingness to participate in the IC system and has also played an instrumental role in organising 'legal' strikes
- 4 See commentary on National Manpower Commission's (NMC) findings on ICs, 'Introduction: Information Update', Howe *ibid*
- 5 See 'Recessionary Strike Triggers: Periodisation Problems' (section 2), Howe *ibid*
- 6 See L van Schalkwyk, 'The New Income Tax Act: Why The Fuss?', Indicator SA Issue Focus, February 1984. Also, 'Recessionary Strike Triggers: Secondary Issues', Howe *ibid*
- 7 For comparisons between pension strike precedent and worker reaction to new tax dispensation, see L van Schalkwyk, 'Worker Perceptions of the New Income Tax System', Indicator SA Industrial Monitor Vol 2 No 1: 14/15
- 8 For update on unity moves during the first half of 1984, see 'Introduction', Howe *op cit*
- 9 Institute for Industrial Relations: Industrial Relations in SA - Review 1983: 25
- 10 See 'Introduction', Howe *op cit*, on NUM strike at Coronation Colliery, June 1984
- 11 Where no IC exists, all Industrial Court actions involving allegations of an 'unfair labour practice' (ULP) are first processed by a Conciliation Board. Therefore, a large proportion of the cases quoted in these statistics overlap
- 12 For further comment on the Industrial Court and the ULP debate, see forthcoming articles by C Albertyn and G Howe, in Indicator SA Industrial Monitor Vol 2 No 3
- 13 Cape Times 1 January 1984
- 14 For in-depth discussion of this new industrial legislation, see two Indicator SA articles by C Albertyn:
 - (a) 'Basic Conditions of Employment Act No 3 of 1983', Indicator SA Industrial Monitor Vol 1 No 2: 3
 - (b) 'Machinery and Occupational Safety Act No 6 of 1983', Indicator SA Industrial Monitor Vol 1 No 3

PART THREE

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TRENDS IN 1983: Survey of IR Commentators' Interpretations

By Graham Howe

Introduction: Survey Participants

The existence of multiple interpretations derived from differing data, extracted from leading annual Industrial Relations (IR) reviews and labour articles, has been highlighted in Part I of this report. As a sequel to the comparison of monitor records, a special Indicator SA survey investigates the complex subject of IR Trend Analysis, based on interviews conducted with 25 prominent IR commentators, to establish the range of interpretations of labour developments during 1983.

Participants in the survey were invited to respond to and comment on several major IR trend interpretations provided in a questionnaire and to rank factors and issues related to labour developments last year. The diverse responses to the statements provided are indicators of the wide range of attitudes and 'ideological' positions operative in the South African IR arena.

In selecting a representative cross-section of IR commentators, attention was paid to drawing on the opinions of experts from various professions. In certain respects, participants were identified on a random basis and the availability of prospective respondents imposed inevitable limitations on the range of opinions surveyed.

A breakdown of occupational categories, with numbers of participants from each group in brackets follows:

IR Consultants in Commerce (6)

'Labour' and 'Management' Lawyers (4)

Independent IR Consultancy Services (3)

Federation/Chamber of Industries and Commerce (3)

IR and Graduate School of Business (GSB) Academics (7)

Labour Reporters/the Media (2)

In an attempt to reflect the variations in labour developments across regions and industrial and commercial sectors, which play a seminal role in collective bargaining, participants were drawn from the core PWV area, the eastern and western Cape, and Natal. A cross-section of representatives of large private corporate, para-statal and commercial/industrial associations and group(s) were surveyed.

Besides six respondents who preferred to participate on an anonymous basis, all other participants are accredited in a separate list (see appendix 4). A copy of the questionnaire is also attached (see appendix 3), though it should be emphasised that not all the information accrued during the course of surveying IR 83 interpretations has been used.¹ The main text is interspersed with discursive comments made by respondents which are presented as useful contextual information, to locate various labour issues against the larger IR backdrop. Where these additional comments were offered by several participants, they have been paraphrased. Responses directly attributed to individual participants usually appear in quotation marks.

Section 1: Determinants and Shift of Trade Union Strategy

Issue

'Given that the emergent black trade union groupings made increasing use of the statutory collective bargaining machinery in 1983, has a shift in union tactics occurred, from 'illegal' strike action to negotiation through official dispute-settling procedures?'

o 3 out of 25 respondents, or 12 percent, felt that a 'major' shift of this nature has occurred

o 22 out of 25 respondents, or 88 percent felt that 'some meaningful' shift has occurred

o none of the 25 participants felt that no meaningful shift of this kind has occurred.

Seven of the 25 respondents broke down their general assessment of the degree of a 'shift' to differentiate between trade union use of the Industrial Court as opposed to the Industrial Councils (ICs). In general, they felt that a major shift towards union use of the Industrial Court had occurred, while some meaningful shift (ie a shift of lesser magnitude) was evident in the corresponding use of ICs.

The perception of a meaningful shift in trade union tactics during 1983 was the one IR Trend Interpretation which found an almost total consensus amongst survey participants. However, some respondents were careful to point out that the term 'shift', was best interpreted as the incorporation by new unions of an additional sphere of action rather than as a mutually exclusive process of forsaking one tactic for another. In other words, the resort to official collective bargaining mechanisms constitutes another channel of trade union action to enforce and apply industrial legislative provisions, rather than indicating a preference for negotiation over 'illegal' strike action.

AECI IR Consultant Bokkie Botha commented that, 'Not only was there an increasing use of statutory machinery, but an even more sophisticated and selective use of the available structures It is a real feature of development in labour relations in SA that the unions have been using the courts with such skill and direction'.² IIR Director Mark Anstey stressed that generalised statements were problematic, as particular unions/groupings made differential usage of the statutory collective bargaining mechanisms.³

Related Factors

Participants were asked to rank in order of importance a list of possible determinants of trade union strategy in 1983 and/or to provide additional determinants they felt to be relevant (see additional factors below).

The figure given in the first right-hand column below represents the number of participants out of the total sample of 25 who felt that the given factors were major, rather than secondary, determinants of trade union strategy during 1983. The figure given in the second right-hand column translates the primary ranking into a percentage.

In analysing responses, given factors ranked between 1-3 in order of importance (ie on a linear basis) were interpreted as a cluster of 'primary' factors and factors ranked between 4-6 as 'secondary' factors.

TABLE 1: Motivating Aspects of Trade Union Strategy

(a) Pragmatism because of economic recession	21/25	84%
(b) Strikes counter-productive with retrenchments	15/25	60%
(c) Growth of union support infra-structure	14/25	56%
(d) Industrial Court loopholes, eg ULP definition ⁴	13/25	52%

The above table reflects a prevailing consensus over the major role of recessionary conditions in promoting a sense of pragmatism among the emergent labour movement, albeit partially dictated by a resultant weaker bargaining position.

However, with regard to (c) and (d) above, 11 out of the 25 respondents, or 44 percent, felt that these factors exerted a secondary rather than primary influence on union strategy in 1983. In other words, expert opinion was almost equally divided on the issues of whether (a) the growth of union support infrastructure (legal, economic and strategy advisors) and (b) legislative loopholes in the formal collective bargaining system were motivating factors of primary or secondary importance in trade union strategy in 1983.

Certain factors given in the questionnaire such as the lesser intrusion of 'politics' and the related prevalence of an economistic outlook, were not assigned high priority by respondents and should be regarded as secondary, if not peripheral determinants of union strategy during 1983:

- o 6 out of 25 respondents, or 24 percent, disagreed that there was an identifiable trend of less intrusion of political issues and the 'non-collaborationist' stance
- o 8 out of 25 respondents, or 32 percent, also rejected an interpretation which posited a prevalent economistic outlook among trade unions.

Additional Factors

Other important factors affecting union strategy during 1983 added by respondents included:

- o Greater unionisation of workers in terms of numbers
- o The consolidation of union membership, allied to inter-trade union unity and the move towards national federation
- o The resultant strengthened bargaining position of workers
- o The burgeoning impact of the Industrial Court in its interpretation of its own incipient role, including the easier availability of status quo orders through this body.

In general, many of the IR experts interviewed felt that the inhibiting potential of the recession as regards the relationship between the unemployment threat and trade union strategy in 1983, though a noticeable feature, had been exaggerated in IR trend interpretations. In fact, it was felt that the 'new' labour movement had considerably more room to manoeuvre within last year than was often perceived.

Another shared perception which emerged from several interviews was that the intrinsic character of the emergent labour movement and the collective bargaining process itself is always 'political' and that a process of increasing politicisation of the IR scenario in South Africa is apparent.

Some of the other illuminating comments offered on the role and validity of these factors include:

- o Labour lawyer John Brand stressed that the migrant labour, homeland and resettlement socio-political systems overshadow all the given micro-factors as determinants of trade union strategy and make for an overarching imbalance in the employer/employee power equation. 'Where 50 percent of all African workers are migrants, the resultant sense of job insecurity as regards the latent threat of deportation underlying the breach of a common law contract is always a primary factor in this scenario'.⁵

- o Barlow Rand IR Legal Consultant Andre Lamprecht commented that, 'within unionised companies, the recession has not played a significant role in reducing wage demands'.⁶

- o IRD Consultant Andrew Levy stated that 'unions have moved from ideological "buzz" to pragmatic action'.⁷

- o UNISA labour lawyer Johan Piron stated that, 'In 1983, the new trade unions strategised to achieve more decisionmaking influence in companies. Recession reflects more on members (the rank and file), as the union leadership, while it needs to answer to the membership, tends to strategise for gains'.⁸

Section 2: The Wider Range of IR Issues in 1983

Issue

'Given that other IR issues besides wage discontent came more to the fore in 1983, is the assertion of a wider range of worker interests and issues primarily an indicator of a more conscientised workforce, greater union expertise, a tactical shift to achievable goals in recession, and/or of other trends?'

- o 18 out of the 25 participants (or 72%) interpreted the expression of a wider range of worker interests as primarily an indicator of greater union expertise

o 14 out of the 25 participants (or 54%) felt this also reflected either a more 'conscientised' workforce or a tactical shift to goals which might be realistically achieved in recession.

Both SASOL IR Manager Denis Shepherd⁹ and AECI's Bokkie Botha¹⁰ emphasised the role played by a management more aware of the needs of their workforce, through actively promoting various newly identified worker needs and creating better structures such as disciplinary codes. Several other labour commentators also pointed to the integral relationship between 'conscientisation', the increased proportion of organised/unionised workers and the greater national/industrial trade union unity gradually accruing from federation moves.

An interesting point was made by one participant who asserted that greater union expertise is especially evident in Natal where FOSATU is particularly well organised, substantiated by the fact that the Industrial Court apparently experiences its heaviest workload in this province.

Related Factors

Participants were asked to rank a given list of worker issues (besides wage discontent, the perennial strike trigger) asserted by the emergent labour movement last year, in order of prominence. It was intended to glean an impressionistic rather than statistical diagnosis of the regularity of these issues.

The figure given in the right-hand column below represents the number of participants out of the total sample of 25 who felt that the given factors were primary, rather than secondary, worker issues during 1983.¹¹ The figure given in the second right-hand column translates this primary ranking into a percentage.

TABLE 2: PRIMARY WORKER ISSUES IN 1983

(a) Retrenchment/Dismissal Procedures	25/25	100%
(b) Unfair Treatment/Supervisory Attitudes	22/25	88%
(c) Cutbacks of Overtime	16/25	64%
(d) Industrial Health/Safe Working Conditions	15/25	60%

It is evident that in the wider context of economic recession, the procedures for dismissal and mass retrenchment - and the implementation thereof - were regarded as the foremost issue asserted by workers and

the new unions last year, often in conjunction with wage discontent. Table 2 also indicates the regularity of expressed worker dissatisfaction with both 'unfair labour practices' in general and the derogatory ('racist') attitudes perceived to exist at the level of line management.

Besides these leading causes, respondents also identified the demand for cutbacks of overtime (as a tactic designed to raise employment levels during recession), the push for improved industrial health legislation and the monitoring of hazardous working conditions as important labour issues on the upsurge.

Some participants expressed their reservations about a linear ranking of major IR issues during 1983, on account of:

- o the regional or sectoral character of worker and union issues they personally considered to have been prominent during 1983
- o the unchanged dominance of certain issues at the heart of the IR scenario
- o the overlap between the issues given in the questionnaire, especially at the actual level of collective bargaining, where a variety of secondary issues might accompany the initial cause of worker discontent.

However, there was general consensus among this group of respondents that in various combinations, wages, job security and the right to work, management labour practices and attitudes, and worker safety preoccupy industrial relations in South Africa.

One participant concluded that in the chemical industry, the primary IR issues were supervisory treatment and attitudes, retrenchment/dismissals, the position of female workers and FOSATU's anti-referendum campaign, in respective order of prominence. Another participant ranked major issues in the Eastern Cape as follows: retrenchment/dismissals, unfair treatment/attitudes, industrial health/safety and female worker rights.

Additional Worker Issues

A myriad 'other' worker and/or interrelated trade union issues omitted in the questionnaire were identified by respondents. These included trade union rivalry, unity and political affiliation; the drive for recognition of established and new unions; worker job insecurity in the context of the migrant labour system and the consequent need to evolve a greater balance of power in the collective bargaining equation; the

negotiation of agreements ratifying trade union representation of a new class of workers; and protection from selective dismissal and re-employment practices in the event of strike action.

TABLE 3: SECONDARY WORKER ISSUES IN 1983

(a) Pensions Investment/Worker Control	17/25	68%
(b) Female Worker Rights	18/25	72%
(c) Anti-Referendum Campaign	18/25	72%

An intriguing aspect of the 'worker politics' debate is reflected in the low rating assigned to FOSATU's anti-referendum pamphlet campaign by most of the respondents. Several participants concurred that while protest against the new constitutional dispensation might have been significant as a token gesture for the unions' black constituency, the campaign was certainly not an event of national political significance. On the other hand, Andre Lamprecht expressed the view that, 'Although current worker issues may be bread-and-butter ones, they nevertheless revert to a political base. The trade unions draw on a long-term 'open' strategy, which is methodically applied to day-to-day negotiations'.¹²

Some of the astute comments offered by the 25 respondents, which tend to contextualise factors unavoidably isolated into separate, compartmentalised issues for the purpose of the questionnaire, were:

o Labour Reporter Philip van Niekerk argued that 'A distinction must be drawn between worker "on line" issues, and trade union causes.' He referred to the example of affiliation to the United Democratic Front (UDF), an issue over which trade unions are unlikely to take strike action, but which is nevertheless a cause of intra-worker dissension.¹³

o Anglo-American IR Consultant R M Godsell disputed the common IR trend interpretation for 1983 of a wider spectrum of worker interests: 'Collective bargaining is not becoming more complex the three dominant factors of negotiation have always been, and remain, wages, job security and safety.'¹⁴

o UCT GSB Assistant Director Kate Jowell questioned the validity of IR trend generalisation, demonstrating that for example, the prominence of issues varied significantly on a regional, company and industry basis.¹⁵

Section 3: The Progress and Form of Changing CB Structures

Issue

Given that South African Industrial Relations are in a state of transition, respondents were asked to indicate their preference for one of two broad options for changing the existing collective bargaining mechanisms:

(a) for legislators to undertake extensive revision of existing collective bargaining and conflict arbitration structures, mechanisms and procedures

(b) for legislators to undertake 'piecemeal' reform of the collective bargaining system on an evolutionary basis.

o 8 out of 25 respondents, or 32 percent, opted for the historical process of 'piecemeal' reform of collective bargaining mechanisms

o 3 out of 25 respondents, or 12 percent, opted for extensive revision of the existing collective bargaining system

o none of the other 14 survey participants accepted either option as a definitive, clear-cut solution.

The eight participants who shared the view that legislative changes should be made on a 'piecemeal' basis felt that evolving collective bargaining forms were best left to the spontaneous outcome of employer/worker interaction within the free market context. They regarded government legislative intervention as already excessive. These respondents felt in general that industrial legislation should follow rather than pre-empt developments which naturally emerge from the changing power equation of the management/labour relationship.

Some instructive feedback and snappy comments on the theme of government intervention in industrial relations were:

o The government takes too much of a lead in collective bargaining: both employers and workers should be more assertive.

o Legislative intervention is not always successful. It is too hybrid an animal.

o Employers and trade unions must set the ground rules for the next five years to find a level of stability.

o Legislative change should legitimate rather than inhibit the process already in motion.

- o Change should not be imposed but based on proper consultation, drawing the emergent labour movement into the process.
- o IR issues should be negotiated between the parties concerned; too easy access to statutory arbitration obstructs the normal CB process.

A 'radical' perspective offered by one participant contrasts well with the approach to government intervention in industrial relations adopted by those respondents in this section who favoured the regulation of collective bargaining forms by unfettered free market forces. The respondent claimed: 'Capital will always interpret government intervention as interference with a so-called free enterprise system, especially where it appears to be in favour of the workers'. He argued that in the course of the capitalist/labour power struggle, it was inevitable - whether desirable or not - that at the de facto level, the state would intervene in this process and offer reforms.¹⁶

An illuminating rider to this debate was offered by Gencor IR Director Naas Steenkamp. He pointed to the crucial but understated role of the government's motivation for the revision of IR legislation. He felt that the benefits or disadvantages accrued from government intervention in the collective bargaining process would be 'dependent on the government's intention, ie whether the role of the Department of Manpower or the Industrial Court is to be protective of workers or repressive'.¹⁷

While conducting the survey, a common criticism encountered among participants was that both the options provided tended to impose an absolute dichotomy between centralised and localised forms of collective bargaining, both of which offered advantages and disadvantages, depending on a host of complex variables such as region, industry and type of union.

Related Factors

Survey participants were asked to indicate their support for a number of given evaluative statements on existing and alternative forms of collective bargaining, in order of validity.

(a) 22 out of the 25 participants, or 88 percent, agreed with the statement that, 'there is a need for localised structures to accommodate joint employer and union negotiations in particular industries/regions'

(b) 21 out of the 25 participants, or 84 percent, agreed with the statement that, 'Industrial Councils and closed-shop agreements have become unrepresentative with the emergence of new unions'

(c) 18 out of the 25 participants, or 72 percent, agreed with the statement that, 'IC's are now more administrative bodies than forums for hard employer/union negotiations'.

The clear divide between responses to the first statement provided and to this section in general (see questionnaire, appendix 3) represent two opposing perspectives of role of ICs in industrial relations:

- o Firstly, 12 out of the 25 participants, or 48 percent, felt that contrary to the dichotomy inferred from the questionnaire, centralised ICs and localised, plant-level collective bargaining structures should not be conceived as mutually exclusive alternatives. In other words, this group felt that IC and plant-level bargaining mechanisms should ideally perform complementary and/or supplementary functions

- o Nevertheless, 15 out of the 25 participants, or 60 percent, agreed with the statement that, 'plant-level agreements are more effective and practicable than centralised IC's'.

Additional Statements

The additional statements articulated by respondents and listed below provide further insight into what would constitute 'ideal' alternatives to the present collective bargaining system:

- o Multi-tiered bargaining forms are necessary, incorporating both industrial- and plant-level bargaining, to reflect regional, industrial and union differences and preferences

- o A new commission is needed to replace the National Manpower Commission (NMC), which operates ineffectively because of too divergent interests and lobbying input

- o Legislative revision is called for at various bargaining levels, eg to enable conciliation boards to operate as negotiating as well as dispute-settling forums

- o A radical restructuring of industrial relations in South Africa must emerge from union demands for a new type of collective bargaining system that operates at both plant- and industry-levels

- o An effective filter mechanism is needed to pre-empt the occasional situation whereby ICs are by-passed and conflict issues are referred directly to the Industrial Court.

Otherwise, the low degree of consensus encountered among participants as to the present functioning of ICs was a striking aspect of the survey.

For example, Wits GSB Lecturer Loet Douwes-Dekker believes that, 'ICs have never been an adequate forum for negotiation and tend to be talkshops, where arbitrators take unilateral decisions'.¹⁸ On the other hand, Anglo-American IR Consultant Bobby Godsell argued that, 'In many cases, many ICs have become more representative with the emergence of new trade unions out of the total of 104 ICs, at least 70 play more than an administrative role, eg in the metal, clothing or chemical industries'.¹⁹

Lastly, Professor S M Swart of the University of Stellenbosch's School of Business Administration offered an interesting comment on the complexities of strike legislation in relation to the declaration of 'legal' strikes by some of the newer unions. He believes that a priority on the agenda for revision of existing industrial legislation is 'the decriminalisation of strike procedures and strikes coupled with the introduction of a right to strike'.²⁰

Section 4: The Industrial Court and Management 'Prerogatives'

Issue

'Do you agree with the view that certain 'inviolable' management prerogatives exist?'

The data collected in the fourth and final section dealing with the implication of Industrial Court actions for the concept of 'management prerogatives' now much in vogue will be presented in a forthcoming Indicator SA article. However, as an interesting cross-reference, initial analysis indicates that advocates of evolutionary collective bargaining reform also believe in the existence of 'inviolable' management prerogatives.

- o 11 out of the 25 participants, or 44 percent, favoured the maintenance of select management prerogatives

- o 14 out of the 25 respondents, or 56 percent, argued that theoretically all IR issues should be open to negotiation.

Correlation Pattern

- o Of the eight participants who in section 3 favoured evolutionary reform, six also predictably cast their 'vote' for non-negotiable management prerogatives.

o Of the other five supporters of the concept of prerogatives, only one of these 'crossed the floor' and opted for 'radical' revision of the existing collective bargaining system, thus contradicting the correlative pattern discussed above.

o None of the remaining five participants out of the 11 respondents in favour of management prerogatives expressed a preference for either type of change in the third section dealing with legislated versus evolutionary change of collective bargaining forms.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 In particular, responses to the fourth section, question 7, dealing with the controversial topic of 'management prerogatives', will be analysed and presented as a data base in a forthcoming Indicator SA. Industrial Monitor Vol 2 No 3
- 2 Telephone Interview (TI) with Botha, 21 May 1984
- 3 TI, Anstey, 21 May 1984
- 4 The familiar acronym 'ULP' refers to the unfair labour practice concept
- 5 TI, Brand, 21 May 1984
- 6 TI, Lamprecht, 21 May 1984
- 7 TI, Levy, early June 1984
- 8 TI, Piron, 18 May 1984
- 9 TI, Shepherd, 17 May 1984
- 10 Botha, op cit
- 11 In comparison to Section 1, related factors, there is a slight methodological variation in the interpretation of responses in this section, as factors ranked on a linear basis between 1-4 were regarded as a cluster of 'primary' factors, and factors ranked between 4-8 as 'secondary' factors respectively
- 12 Lamprecht, op cit
- 13 TI, Van Niekerk, 29 May 1984
- 14 TI, Godsell, 5 June 1984
- 15 TI, Jowell, 17 May 1984
- 16 TI, Anonymous Participant, 24 May 1984
- 17 TI, Steenkamp, 17 May 1984
- 18 TI, Douwes-Dekker, 22 May 1984
- 19 Godsell, op cit
- 20 TI, Swart, 16 May 1984.

● **MONITOR ACRONYMS** ●

AAC	Anglo American Corporation
DOM	Department of Manpower
IIR	Institute for Industrial Relations
IRD	Industrial Relations Data (Levy)
IRTC	Industrial Relations Trend Consultants (Bendix)
NMC	National Manpower Commission
SAIRR	S A Institute of Race Relations

● **TRADE UNION ACRONYMS** ●

AAWU	African Allied Workers' Union
ABWU	Amalgamated Black Workers' Union
AFCWU	African Food and Canning Workers' Union
BAWU	Black Allied Workers' Union
BAMCWU	Black Allied Mining and Construction Workers' Union
BCAWU	Building, Construction and Allied Workers' Union
BEEWU	Black Electronics and Electrical Workers' Union
BGWU	Black General Workers' Union
BHAWUSA	Black Health and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa
CCAWUSA	Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa
CLOWU	Clothing Workers' Union
CTMEA	Cape Town Municipal Workers' Association
CUSA	Council of Unions of South Africa
CWIU	Chemical Workers' Industrial Union
EAWU	Electrical and Allied Workers' Union
FBWU	Food and Beverage Workers' Union
FCWU	Food and Canning Workers' Union
FOSATU	Federation of South African Trade Unions
GAWU	General and Allied Workers' Union
GWU(WP)	Garment Workers' Union of the Western Province
GWU	General Workers' Union
IAWUSA	Insurance and Assurance Workers' Union of South Africa
MACWUSA	Motor Assembly and Component Workers' Union
MAWU	Metal and Allied Workers' Union
MGWU	Municipal and General Workers' Union
MWASA	Media Workers' Association of South Africa
MWU	Mine Workers' Union
NAAWU	National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union
NFW	National Federation of Workers
NGWU	National General Workers' Union
NUTW	National Union of Textile Workers
NUWSA	National Union of Workers of South Africa
PWAWU	Paper, Wood and Allied Workers' Union
SAAWU	South African Allied Workers' Union
SACWU	South African Chemical Workers' Union
SASJ	South African Society of Journalists
SEAWU	Steel, Engineering and Allied Workers' Union
SFAWU	Sweet Food and Allied Workers' Union
TAWU	Transport and Allied Workers' Union
TGWU	Transport and General Workers' Union
UAMAWU	United African Motor and Allied Workers' Union
UMMAWOSA	United Mining, Metal and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa

Appendix 2

● BREAKDOWN OF INDIVIDUAL STRIKES ON REGIONAL BASIS, 1983 ●

KEY:	Company	Branch location
Strike trigger issue(s)	<div> <div>AECI (Sasolburg)</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • grievance • re supervisor </div> <div> <div>SACWU</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 300 workers • 2 shifts </div>	<div>Trade union</div> <div>Duration of strike</div>

● STRIKES — JANUARY to MARCH 1983 ●

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSCAAL	NATAL	DATE
		GALLO AFRICA (Bedfordview) • recognition • CCAWUSA • ±50 workers ASSOCIATED DIESEL (Jhb) • dismissal • 20 workers • 1 shift		14.1.83
		PUTCO (Vosloosrus) • grievance • re supervisor • 5 hour • 175 workers go-slow		16.1.83
		AECI (Sasolburg) • grievance • SACWU • re supervisor • 2 shifts • 300 workers		17.1.83
		GALLO AFRICA (Bedfordview) • retrench- • CCAWUSA • ments • 2 shifts • 100 workers		1.2.83
		AECI (Bedfordview) • diverse • SACWU • grievances • 4 shifts		3.2.83
			CARLETONVILLE CONCRETE (Estcourt) • wage • SAAWU • negotiations	4.2.83
		PUTCO (East Rand) • grievance • re supervisor • 250 workers • 2 shifts		15.2.83
	OK BAZAARS (Port Elizabeth) • dismissal • CCAWUSA • 103 workers • 18 days			19.2.83
	FRY'S SMELTER PLANT (Berlin) • retrench- • SAAWU • ments • fired • 173 workers			24.2.83
	BRITO'S BAKERY (Port Elizabeth) • overtime • 200 workers • 1 shift			26.2.83
	CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY (Queenstown) • recognition • AFCWU • 70 workers • 2 shifts (fired)		SAFEGUARD (Durban) • wages • CCAWUSA • 350 workers • 5 shifts NINIAN & LESTER (Pinetown) • dismissal • NUTW • 300 workers • 5 shifts	9.3.83

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSVAAL	NATAL	DATE
		MAKRO (Bedfordview) • dismissal • CCAWUSA • 70 workers • half shift		16.3.83
		THE STAR (Jhb) • dismissal • MWASA • 209 workers • 3 shifts		17.3.83
		LANDDROST SUNNYSIDE & TOWER HOTELS • promotions • CCWUSA • 180 workers • 4 hours		23.3.83
			UNION FLOUR MILLS (Durban) • grievance • SAAWU re personnel • 1 shift officer • 400 workers	25.3.83
• STRIKES — APRIL and MAY 1983 •				
		BEISA URANIUM (Welkom) • accident • 700 workers • 1 shift		11.4.83
		CARLTON PAPER (Wadeville) • diverse • PWWU grievances • 6 hours • 400 workers		13.4.83
			DRG SACKS (Mobeni) • pensions • SAAWU • 100 workers • 1 shift	14.4.83
			MAYDON WHARF COLD STORAGE • dismissal • SAAWU • 410 workers • Rep. Stop (fired)	15.4.83
		GARANKUA BAKERY • arrest of • 6 shifts colleagues		23.4.83
		CROWNGOLD JEWELLERY (Jhb) • diverse • half shift grievances • 31 workers		24.4.83
			PREMIER PAPER (Kliprivier) • wages and • PWWU grievances • 15 shifts • 300 workers	25.4.83
		ROSEBANK HOTEL (Jhb) • dismissal • CCAWUSA • 200 workers • 1 shift (fired)		29.4.83
	SUNBLEST BAKERY (Port Elizabeth) • allowances • GWUOSA • 53 workers • half shift (fired)			30.4.83
		DURAPENTA (Germiston) • grievance • CWIU re supervisor • 1 shift • 120 workers (fired)		4.5.83
		SAMS FOOD (Sandton) • wages and • CCAWUSA grievances • 4 shifts • 9 workers		5.5.83

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSVAAL	NATAL	DATE
	KENTUCKY FRIED (Queenstown) • dismissal • AFCWU • 15 workers • half shift			13.5.83
		MAIZECOR (Waltloo) • dismissals • FBWU • 400 workers • 1 shift (fired)		17.5.83
		OK BAZAARS (Randburg) • grievance • CCAWUSA re supervisor • half shift • 80 workers		19.5.83
		PUTCO (Springs) • dismissal & • TGWU grievance re • 2 shifts supervisor • 150 workers		25.5.83
• STRIKES — JUNE 1983 •				
		KROST BROTHERS (Herriotdale) • retrenchment • MAWU • 1300 workers • 4 shifts		1.6.83
		CHECKERS (East Rand) • grievance re • CCAWUSA management • 1 shift • 400 workers GRAND BAZAARS (Rosettenville) • dismissal/ • CCAWUSA wages • 4 shifts		3.6.83
		ASEA ELECTRIC (Pretoria) • pensions & • MAWU recognition • 2 shifts • 300 workers SILICATE CHEMICALS (Boksburg) • grievance re • CWIU supervisor • 3 shifts • 90 workers	NAMPAK (Mobeni) • pensions & • SAAWU recognition • 6 shifts • 400 workers (fired)	6.6.83
		BITCON INDUSTRIES (Wadeville) • diverse • 1 shift grievances • (fired) • 120 workers		7.6.83
		LITEMASTER (Germiston) • retrenchments • MAWU SALCAST (East Rand) • dismissals • MAWU		9.6.83
		DUNLOP INDUSTRIAL (Benoni) • short-time • CWIU • 400 workers • 4 shifts		13.6.83
			COROBRIK (Durban) • grievance/ retrenchment • 500 workers • half shift	21.6.83
		COCA COLA BOTTLING (Vereeniging) • wages • SFAWU • 300 workers • 2 shifts		22.6.83
		PATONS & BALDWINS (Randfontein) • wages • TWU • 400 workers • 6 shifts DUNSWART IRON & STEEL (Benoni) • retrenchments • MAWU & SABS • 500 workers • 4 shifts		23.6.83

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSVAAL	NATAL	DATE
		ASEA ELECTRIC (Rosslyn) • dismissal • 300 workers		24.6.83
		T W BECKETT (Isando) • dismissals • SFAWU • 300 workers • 1 shift	NATAL THREAD (Hammarisdale) • wages • NUTW • 315 workers • overtime ban 27.5 hrs	27.6.83
		LEBOWA TRANSPORT • dismissal • 200 workers • 2 shifts		28.6.83
		PRIMA FINE MEATS (Doornfontein) • wages • 250 workers • 8 shifts D & D H FRASER (Hdtle) • wages • CCAWUSA • 196 workers • 4 shifts BARLOW MANUFACTURING (Kew) • wages/ • MAWU recognition • 11 shifts • 450 workers	W B CAMERONS (Jacobs) • wages/ • MAWU recognition • 7 shifts • 450 workers	29.6.83
		AECI (Sasolburg) • accident • SAAWU • 350 workers • 8 shifts KOHLER CORRUGATED • recognition/ • PWAUWU closed shop • half shift		30.6.83
• STRIKES — JULY 1983 •				
		GOLF STEEL (Kathlehong) • wages • 200 workers • 1 shift CHECKERS STORES (Jhb) • supervisor/ • CCAWUSA dismissal/wages • 8 shifts • 700 workers		1.7.83
		BARLOW MANUFACTURING (Alrode) • wages • MAWU • 700 workers • 5 shifts		2.7.83
		AECI PAINTS (Alrode) • wages • SACWU • 250 workers • 5 shifts SIEMENS (Pretoria) • grievances • 1 shift re supervisor • 12 workers		4.7.83
			UNIPLY (Cato Ridge) • grievance • PWAUWU • 350 workers • 1 shift	6.7.83
		LITEMASTER (Wadeville) • retrenchments • MAWU • 260 workers • 5 shifts		7.7.83
		CONSOLIDATED WIRE (Pretoria) • pensions • SAAWU • 200 workers • 1 shift		8.7.83
		JET STORES (Sasol) • dismissal • CCAWUSA • 10 workers • 3 shifts		9.7.83
			UNIVERSAL LACE (Pinetown) • wages • 170 workers • half shift	11.7.83

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSVAAL	NATAL	DATE
		BARLOW MANUFACTURING (Kew) • dismissal • MAWU • 450 workers • 1 shift (fired)	MOSAIC PRODUCTS (Estcourt) • wages • BAWU • 160 workers • half shift (fired)	13.7.83
		LIBERTY LIFE (Jhb) • wages/ • IAWU recognition • 2.5 shifts • 140 workers COCA COLA (Vanderbijl) • wages • SFAWU • 350 workers • 3 shifts		14.7.83
CAPE IRON & STEEL • recognition • GWU • 175 workers • 1 shift		SHATTERPRUFE (Pretoria) • overtime • CWIU • 6 hours SUPREME MOULDINGS (Robertsville) • dismissal/ • PWAU recognition • half shift • 50 workers		18.7.83
			OCEAN MANUFACTURING (Pinetown) • wages • MAWU • 235 workers • 6 shifts (fired)	20.7.83
AFRICAN SPUN CONCRETE (Cape Town) • recognition • GWU • 170 workers • 10 shifts				25.7.83
		UNIEWINKELS WAREHOUSE (Pretoria) • retrenchment • CCAWUSA • 1 shift		26.7.83
PROVINCIAL ROADS (Beaufort West) • grievances • GWU • 350 workers • 3 shifts				28.7.83
• STRIKES — AUGUST 1983 •				
		DANISH CONFECTIONERY (Jhb) • grievance • CCAWUSA re supervisor • half shift • 7 workers	BAYHEAD REFINERY • wages • 1 shift	1.8.83
		SPAR (Discovery) • grievances/ • CCAWUSA wages • 1 shift • 19 workers		2.8.83
		AECI (Modderfontein) • grievance • SACWU re supervisor • 2 shifts • 1400 workers		3.8.83
		ASEA ELECTRIC (Rosslyn) • wages • MAWU • 300 workers • 1 shift		7.8.83
		MEGAPLASTICS (Olifantsfontein) • dismissals • SAAWU • 55 workers • 3 shifts FIRESTONE (Brits) • wages • NAAWU • 400 workers • 3 shifts	HOLLAND ELECTRO-CHEM • wages • 4 shifts • 650 workers	8.8.83
		OMEGA-BARFEL • dismissal • SAAWU • 55 workers • 2 shifts (fired)		9.8.83
			S A BREWERIES (Prospecton) • overtime • 30 workers • half shift	11.8.83

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSVAAL	NATAL	DATE
		WATERGATE DATCO (Alrode) • wages • 7 workers • 1 shift (fired)		12.8.83
		G & W BASE (Wadeville) • wages • CWIU • 250 workers • overtime ban 5 hours CLINICAL LABORATORIES (Jhb) • dismissal/ • BHAWUSA grievances • 100 workers		15.8.83
		INDO ATLANTIC (Jhb) • wages • half shift • 70 workers (fired)		16.8.83
		VANESS PRODUCTS (Pretoria) • wages • NGWU • 26 workers • 3 shifts		17.8.83
			KILBARCHAN COAL • wages/ • SAAWU grievances • 230 workers • 4 shifts	19.8.83
		ISCOR'S SISHEN MINE • pensions • 2000 • 2 shifts workers FIRESTONE (Brits) • wages • NAAWU • 360 workers • 8 shifts PRIDE POOLS (Olifantsfontein) • wages • BACWU • 53 workers • half shift (fired)	QUEENSBURGH MUNICIPALITY • wages • TGWU • 200 workers • half shift	23.8.83
		MASTERBUILT (Olifantsfontein) • dismissal • SAAWU • 100 workers • 1 shift		26.8.83
		DELMAS MILLING • retrenchment • FBWU /recognition • 2 shifts • 300 workers		29.8.83
		MAIZECOR (Waterloo) • wages • FBWU • 100 workers • half shift		30.8.83
		CI HOMES (Boksburg) • retrenchment • BACWU • 200 workers • 1 shift (fired)	HAMMARSDALE CLOTHING • re-employ- • NUTW ment • 1 shift • 300 workers	31.8.83
• STRIKES — SEPTEMBER 1983 •				
		INT. METAL & MACH. (Jhb) • wages • half shift • 14 workers		1.9.83
		UNIPARK POTTERIES (Vanderbijl) • wages • BCAWU • 20 workers • 1 shift (fired)		4.9.83
		UNITED BREWERIES (Garankua) • wages • 2 shifts • 13 workers (fired)		6.9.83

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSCAAL	NATAL	DATE
		CHECKERS (Primrose) • overtime • CCAWUSA • 45 workers • half shift OK BAZAARS (Randburg) • grievance • CCAWUSA re guard • 1 hour • 100 workers		8.9.83
		STANDARD BRASS (Benoni) • recognition • MAWU • 400 workers • 4 shifts		9.9.83
AUTOPLASTICS (Port Elizabeth) • wages • NAAWU • 250 workers • 3 shifts	AUTOPLASTICS (Cape Town) • wages • NAAWU • 150 workers • 3 shifts	AUTOPLASTICS (Rosslyn) • wages • NAAWU • 600 workers • 4 shifts		12.9.83
			UMHLANGA MUNICIPALITY • wages/ • NFW recognition • 1 shift • 100 workers (fired)	15.9.83
		WEST DRIEFONTEIN MINE • safety • NUM • 17 workers • 4 shifts (fired) PRINTPAK (Industria) • dismissal/ • PWWU recognition • 3 shifts • 250 workers		22.9.83
		BARLOW MANUFACTURING (Jhb) • wages • MAWU • 500 workers • 2 shifts VAN DRIMMELENS LAB (Jhb) • dismissal/ • BHAUSA grievances • 60 workers	FLAMINGO TEXTILES (Hammarstad) • dismissal • NUTW • 10 shifts	27.9.83
		CULLINAN REFRACTORIES • wages LIBERTY LIFE (Jhb) • recognition • IAWUSA • 90 workers • one & half shifts (fired) GAME DISCOUNT (Eastgate) • wages • CCAWUSA • 40 workers • 2 shifts (fired)		29.9.83
		CHECKERS (Pretoria) • grievance re • CCAWUSA management • half shift • 60 workers AFRICAN SALES (Jhb) • retrenchment • CCAWUSA • 50 workers • half shift		30.9.83
• STRIKES — OCTOBER 1983 •				
		COALEQUIP • dismissal • MAWU • 76 workers • half shift (fired)	SMITH & NEPHEW (Pinetown) • grievance re • NUTW management • 6 shifts • 175 workers	3.10.83

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSVAAL	NATAL	DATE
		COLGATE PALMOLIVE (Boksburg) • grievance re • CWIU management • half shift • 300 workers GRAND BAZAAR (Rosettenville) • dismissals • CCAWUSA • 54 workers		5.10.83
		YORK TIMBERS (Pretoria) • wages • SAAWU • 182 workers • 2 shifts (fired)		7.10.83
		CHECKERS (Primrose) • dismissal • CCAWUSA • 50 workers • 2 shifts POOLE INDUSTRIES (Pretoria) • wages/ • NGWU pension • 6 shifts • 300 workers (fired) UNION CARRIAGE (Nigel) • retrenchment • MAWU • 900 workers • 2 shifts		11.10.83
		FELTEX FOAM (Pretoria) • dismissal • 300 workers • 4 shifts		12.10.83
		PIENAAR & GRABS (Rosslyn) • dismissal/ • SAAWU assault • half shift • 51 workers (fired)		15.10.83
O.F.S. CHECKERS (Virginia) • grievance re • CCAWUSA management • 50 workers		FARMFARE (Eastgate) • canteen • PBWU prices • 100 workers KLEENIM BRUSH • wages/recognition • 310 workers		18.10.83
	CHECKERS (Queenstown) • wages/ • CCAWUSA grievance • half shift • 16 workers			20.10.83
		CALTEX OIL (Benoni) • dismissal • 12 workers • half shift		21.10.83
		GALLO AFRICA (Bedfordview) • dismissal • CCAWUSA • 70 workers • 2 shifts		24.10.83
		ASEA CABLES (Rosslyn) • dismissal • MAWU • 327 workers • 4 shifts (fired)		25.10.83
		NAMPAK TISSUE (Pretoria) • wages • SAAWU • 250 workers • 4 shifts CULLINAN IND. PORCELAIN • wages • BCAAU • 340 workers • 1 shift	R J SOUCHY (Durban) • dismissal/ • SAAWU recognition • 1000 workers ROWEN S A (Durban) • dismissal • RASTWU • 1500 workers	26.10.83
CARBORUNDUM UNIV. (Port Elizabeth) • retrenchment • MAWU • 200 workers • 1 shift		CROWN REEF RESTAURANTS • wages • Hotelica • 35 workers • 1 shift (fired) GOLD SMITH CO. (Jhb) • dismissal • AAWU • 20 workers • half shift (fired)		27.10.83

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSVAAL	NATAL	DATE
HODGETT TIMBERS (East London) • recognition • SAAWU • 30 workers • half shift (fired)		KENT MOTORS (Jhb) • stickers/ • MAWU dismissal • half shift	EPOL (Pietermaritzburg) • referendum • SFAWU • 100 workers • 6 hours FED. TIMBERS (Pinetown) • wages • 100 workers • 8 shifts	28.10.83
		RHEEM S A • grievance re • half shift supervisor	PRESSURE DIE (Wiltown) • dismissals • 80 workers • 4 shifts FED. TIMBERS (Moben) • wages • 200 workers • 4 shifts	31.10.83
• STRIKES — NOVEMBER 1983 •				
		WINTERVELD CHROME MINE • wages • MAWU • 850 workers • 9 shifts	UMFOLOZI SUGAR CO-OP • referendum/ • NASRAEIU recognition • 600 workers • 3 shifts	1.11.83
			AMATIKULU & FELIXTON MILLS • referendum • NASRAEIU • 1400 workers • 2 shifts	2.11.83
		CHECKERS (Eastgate) • grievance re • CCAWUSA management • half shift • 30 workers		5.11.83
		ST. JOHNS KNITWEAR (Hammarisdale) • diverse • SAAWU grievances • 4 shifts • 80 workers (fired)		7.11.83
ARTHUR SEAT HOTEL (Cape Town) • wages • 90 workers • 1 shift		JATEX (Rosslyn) • dismissal • NUTW • 150 workers • 6 shifts		9.11.83
		GOLDEN ERA STATIONERS (Jhb) • dismissal/ • PWAU recognition • 3 shifts • 100 workers		11.11.83
			BESTCONSTRUCTA (Phoenix) • wages • 500 workers • 1 shift	14.11.83
			DEFY (Newcastle) • retrenchment • SAAWU • 500 workers • 4 shifts	15.11.83
	SHATTERPRUFE (Port Elizabeth) • wages • CWIU • 400 workers • half shift			17.11.83
		MASTERBUILT (Olifantsfontein) • dismissal/ • 1 shift wages • 200 workers		18.11.83
		AFRICAN ALTEX (Jhb) • bonus • 29 workers • half shift NEW & GOLDEN PAPER • dismissal/ • PWAU recognition • half shift • 100 workers	NGAGAME QUARRIES • repatriation • SAAWU • 1 shift	21.11.83

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSVAAL	NATAL	DATE
		SIMBA QUIX (Isando) • grievance re management • SFAWU • 700 workers • 4 shifts JOHNSON TILE (Ollifantsfontein) • sympathy • half shift strike (Cullinan)		22.11.83
			DGM BUS SERVICE (Stanger) • recognition • SAAWU • 200 workers • 1 shift	24.11.83
		KENTUCKY CHICKEN (Reef) • wages and grievances • CCAWUSA • 120 workers • 4 shifts		28.11.83
		HYPERAMA (Jhb) • dismissal • CCAWUSA • 1 shift FRESH MEAT SUPPLY (Jhb) • overtime • SFAWU • 160 workers • 1 shift (fired) KABELKAR • overtime • SFAWU • 30 workers • 1 shift (fired)		29.11.83
		STANDARD BRASS (Benoni) • wages • MAWU • 400 workers • 4 shifts	BAKERS LTD (Durban) • wages • half shift	30.11.83
• STRIKES — DECEMBER 1983 •				
		CARLTON PAPER (Wadeville) • dismissal • PWAU • 250 workers • 4 shifts		6.12.83
		UNION LIQUID AIR (Germiston) • recognition • CWIU • 120 workers • 1 shift	BESTFORM (Newcastle) • diverse • SAAWU grievances • 80 workers • half shift	7.12.83
		CARAMEL SWEETMAKERS • union • SFAWU membership • 1 shift • 120 workers (fired)		8.12.83
		GENERAL TIRE (Booyssens) • dismissals • GAWU • 70 workers • 7 shifts		9.12.83
		O K BAZAARS (Vereeniging) • worker • CCAWUSA friction • half shift • 120 workers		10.12.83
	FORD-STRUANDALE (Port Elizabeth) • dismissal • 700 workers • 4 shifts			12.12.83
		PICK 'N PAY (Vereeniging) • wages • 200 workers • 3 shifts	NORTILL ENGINEERING (Mkondeni) • bonus • MAWU • 150 workers • 1 shift	13.12.83

W.CAPE	E.CAPE	TRANSVAAL	NATAL	DATE
		PICK 'N PAY (Kroonstad) • wages • CCAWUSA • 150 workers • 1 shift		14.12.83
		PUTCO (Wembley) • dismissals • 170 workers • 3 shifts		15.12.83
			TEALES FARM PRODUCE (Estcourt) • wages/ • SAAWU bonus • 20 workers • 3 shifts	17.12.83
			BAKERS (Durban) • grievances • one & half • 200 workers hours	21.12.83
SOURCE Bendix (IRC) <i>Review of Industrial Relations</i> op cit				

● SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE FROM SURVEY ●

CENTRE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES
INDICATOR PROJECT S A
UNIVERSITY OF NATAL
DURBAN



GRAHAM HOWE
LORETTA VAN SCHALKWYK

CONFIDENTIAL TWENTY MINUTE QUESTIONNAIRE
(You will be telephoned for your responses.)

Industrial Relations Trends QUESTIONNAIRE

Four interpretations of major trends to emerge on the Industrial Relations scene in South Africa in 1983 appear below.

1. Please indicate your response to each of the main statements by TICKING the boxes provided.
2. Rank or mark the related factors/attitudes provided with each statement.
3. Please feel free to either include additional factors considered to be relevant, or to exclude any of the given factors.

A STATEMENT NO 1:

It is contended that the emergent black trade union groupings made increasing use of the statutory collective bargaining machinery in 1983.

1. QUESTION:

Has a shift in union tactics occurred, from 'illegal' strike action to negotiation through official dispute-settling procedures? (TICK where appropriate)

RESPONSE:

YES	-	major shift occurred	<input type="checkbox"/>
YES	-	some meaningful shift occurred	<input type="checkbox"/>
NO	-	no meaningful shift occurred	<input type="checkbox"/>

2. RELATED FACTORS:

Please rank these possible determinants of trade union strategy in 1983, in order of the importance of their influence:

MOTIVATING ASPECTS:

ORDER OF IMPORTANCE

- | | |
|--|--------------------------|
| 1. Greater union pragmatism in economic recession, the consequence of a weakened bargaining position. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. Loopholes in formal system, especially as regards Industrial Court arbitration: eg, exploiting vague legislative definition of unfair labour practices. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. Growth of union support infra-structure (legal, economic and strategy advisors) leads to emphasis on formal negotiation process | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. Less intrusion of political issues and militant stance of non-collaboration with 'system'. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. The counter-productive nature of strike activity in the context of mass retrenchment. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. Prevalence of economic outlook, acceptance of boundaries of employer/worker bargaining forum. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. Other (specify) _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> |

B STATEMENT NO 2:

Other industrial relations issues besides wage discontent came more to the fore in 1983.

3. QUESTION:

Do you interpret the assertion of a wider range of worker interests and issues as primarily an indicator of one or more of the following: (TICK where appropriate.)

RESPONSE:

1. A more conscientised workforce? and/or	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Greater union expertise? and/or	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. A tactical shift to achievable goals in recession?	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Other (specify) _____	<input type="checkbox"/>

2.

4. RELATED FACTORS

In what order of prominence would you rank the following worker causes and/or trade union issues in 1983?

ORDER OF PROMINENCE

WORKER ISSUES

1. Retrenchment/Dismissal procedures
2. Unfair treatment/Derogatory attitudes of Line Management
3. Industrial Health/Safety of working conditions
4. Cutbacks of overtime, related to raising of employment levels in recessionary conditions
5. Pensions, with thrust for worker control of funds/investment for improvement of black living conditions
6. Position of female workers/Maternity rights
7. FOSATU's anti-referendum pamphlet campaign
8. Other (specify) _____

C. STATEMENT NO 3:

South African industrial relations are in a state of transition.

(TICK where appropriate)

5. RESPONSE:

1. Is it necessary for legislators to undertake extensive revision of existing collective bargaining and conflict arbitration structures, mechanisms and procedures?

OR

2. Is the historical process of evolutionary, piecemeal reform of this 'system' a satisfactory alternative?

6. RELATED FACTORS:

Which of the following statement on forms of collective bargaining do you support? Please rank these in order of validity:

ORDER OF VALIDITY

1. Plant-level agreements are more effective and practicable than centralised Industrial Councils.
2. Industrial Councils (IC's) and closed-shop agreements have become unrepresentative with the emergence of new unions.
3. IC's are now more administrative bodies than forums for hard employer/union negotiations
4. There is a need for localised structures to accommodate joint employer and union negotiations in particular industries/regions
5. Other (specify) _____

D. STATEMENT NO 4:

Do you agree with the view that certain inviolable 'management' prerogatives exist? (TICK where appropriate)

RESPONSE

YES	NO
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7. RELATED FACTORS:

Please indicate traditional spheres of management authority you consider to be negotiable/non-negotiable, which were challenged by worker assertion of broader rights and Industrial Court actions in 1983. (TICK where appropriate)

TRADITIONAL PREROGATIVES

1. The contractual right of employers to dismiss workers (even where negotiated procedures were followed).
2. The authority of line management as regards 'fair' and 'unfair' practices and attitudes
3. Measures required of management to reasonably assure work safety
4. Demands for overtime reduction to spread employment.
5. The transfer of plant-level conflicts of rights as well as of interests to the Industrial Court.
6. The general intrusion of government and unions into areas of management responsibility.
7. Other (specify) _____

NEGOTIABLE	NON-NEGOTIABLE

● LIST OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS ●

The following IR commentators participated in the IR trend interpretation survey. For various reasons, six respondents out of a total group of 25 requested that their identities be kept anonymous and the information provided be interpreted as generalised comments on IR trends. The accredited participants are listed in alphabetical order:

- ☐ Mark Anstey, Executive Director, Institute for Industrial Relations (IIR)
- ☐ Bokkie Botha, IR Consultant, African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI)
- ☐ John Brand, Labour Lawyer (Johannesburg)
- ☐ Loet Douwes Dekker, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of the Witwatersrand (Wits)
- ☐ Friede Dowle, IR spokesperson, Federated Chamber of Industry (Pretoria)
- ☐ Robert M Godsell, IR Consultant, Anglo-American Corporation (AAC)
- ☐ Theo Heffer, Group Manpower Consultant, Grinaker Holdings
- ☐ Frank Horwitz, formerly with Wits GSB
- ☐ Kate Jowell, GSB Assistant Director, University of Cape Town
- ☐ Andrew Levy, Industrial Relations Consultant (IRD)
- ☐ Andre J Lamprecht, IR Legal Consultant, Barlow Rand
- ☐ Johann Piron, Head of School of Business Leadership, UNISA
- ☐ Robyn Rafel, Labour Reporter, Financial Mail
- ☐ Denis Sheperd, SASOL IR Manager
- ☐ Naas Steenkamp, IR Director, General Mining Union Corporation (GENCOR)
- ☐ S M (Blackie) Swart, School of Business Administration, University of Stellenbosch
- ☐ Philip van Niekerk, Labour Reporter, Rand Daily Mail
- ☐ An IR spokesperson for a Chamber of Commerce
- ☐ An IR spokesperson for a Federation of Industries

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